Ethnic kinship


Quantification and Increase through Political Evolution

Frank Salter

[Original details:]

Max Planck Society, Human Ethology,

Von-der-Tann-Str. 3,

82346 Andechs, Germany

Notes for a report presented at the 16th biennial meeting of the International Society for Human Ethology, 7-10 August 2002, Montreal


Biological theories of the origin of heroism in warfare and other types of altruism directed towards the tribe or ethnic group have often attributed this to some adaptive function, such as retention of group resources. However, without an estimate of the aggregate kinship at stake within the group, no theory of altruism can be tested using W. D. Hamilton’s rule for adaptive altruism. By “adaptive”, Hamilton meant evolutionarily stable, such that the altruist’s genes are not selected out of the gene pool. Though Hamilton’s 1975 model showed that ethnic kinship could theoretically be large, no evolutionary theory has yet answered the most basic question, whether in fact ethnic kinship—the genetic similarity of co-ethnics who are not genealogical kin—is ever large enough to make ethnic altruism adaptive.

Harpending (2002) derived a population-genetic formula for estimating the aggregate ethnic kinship held by one population in relation to another based on the genetic distance between the two populations. The genetic assay data needed to make this estimate for modern ethnic groups are becoming available. The data used in this present study are provided by Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994). Based on those data, aggregate ethnic kinship is much larger than aggregate family kinship. Data on tribal genetic distance are uncertain. But existing evidence indicates that tribal genetic interests vis a vis neighbouring tribes in the Neolithic were already larger than familial kinship. The direction of theory and data strongly indicate that self sacrificial altruism in warfare could have been adaptive from that time.

The Hamilton-Harpending algorithm offers an analytical tool for estimating whether a population was (or is) a fit object for altruism, and thus whether that altruism was (or is) sustainable across evolutionary time.


Hamilton’s Fst statement referred to genes coding for altruism, not to the whole genome. However, my point regarding kinship remains valid because I used Fst data based on sampling of the genome, not on altruistic genes.

Also please note that the more accurate data provided by the Human Genome Data Base show somewhat lower racial variation and therefore lower racial kinship. Instead of 9%, the French-Japanese variation is 6% (Salter and Harpending 2013). Because the reduction is not great it does not invalidate the analysis.

Salter, F. K., & Harpending, H. (2013). J. P. Rushton’s theory of ethnic nepotism. Personality and Individual Differences, 55, 256-260. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2012.11.014

I also should correct one part of my summary of David Goetze’s insight concerning collective goods, such as big-game hunting and collective defence. From about the 3 minute mark I say that these cooperative activities allow large investments to be made in large populations. Actually, they also allow small investments to make a difference.


The key issue in the evolutionary theory of ethnic conflict is whether solidarity towards fellow ethnics has been adaptive. Components of this problem are:

(1) Was the kinship between random members of bands and tribes large enough for altruism directed towards fellow ethnics to have been adaptive?

(2) If the answer to (1) is yes, then what mechanisms were necessary? Answering this question will help locate the stage in political evolution at which ethnic altruism could have become adaptive, thus allowing genes or culture that code for ethnic altruism to spread through the population.

We already know the answer, or much of the answer, to the second question. Proponents of group selection have argued, convincingly I think, that members of bands and tribes can behave altruistically without being selected out by free riders. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1982) argued from his field observations that mutual monitoring, ubiquitous in small-scale societies, is sufficient to suppress cheating. He pointed to the pronounced group identity and mutual support found in primitive societies, and argued that this originated in kinship bonds. The cohesion of band and tribal societies makes them units of selection, Eibl argued. This point was elaborated by Boyd and Richerson (1992), who argue that monitoring and punishment are so effective in small scale societies that they allow the evolution of cooperation, or any other characteristic that is promoted by a culturally-governed group strategy.

Whether or not one accept that group selection has figured in human evolution, the mechanisms advanced by group selectionists are sufficient to allow a more conservative process, extended kin selection, to occur. In fact this is what Eibl has always meant by his version of group selection.

A final mechanism deserving of mention is collective goods. A criticism of extended kin selection is that it is impossible for an individual effectively to invest in a kin group much larger than a family, because the benefit would be spread so thinly that the payoff would always be greater from investing in close kin, rather than distant ones. Goetze (1998) has dispelled this concern. He draws on economic theory to argue that by contributing to collective goods—such as hunting large game animals or defending the group—allows an individual to confer a large fitness benefit on a large number of individuals.

So there is no mechanical problem with the feasibility of individuals showing altruism to kin groups larger than the extended family. Indeed, all these mechanism—control of free-riders, bonding the group, and choosing or fashioning collective goods—are highly scalable. They can be increased in scale to accommodate a kin group of any size. Admittedly some novel and ingenious social devices are needed to perform these functions for large groups, but humans are ingenious, as is clear from the many experiments in political evolution.

Thus the second problem in understand the evolution of ethnocentrism the second is already solved, or well on its way to being solved. It’s the first problem that remains; indeed, it has hardly been addressed. To reiterate, was the kinship between random members of bands and tribes large enough for altruism directed between them to have been adaptive?

The question should be recast in light of Goetze’s analysis of collective goods. I shall use the term ‘patriotism’ to mean altruism towards a collective good. When collective goods are available to which individuals can contribute, is the aggregate kinship of the whole group sufficiently high to allow patriotism to be adaptive, i.e. evolutionarily stable? Dawkins thinks not. He maintains that only altruism shown to close kin is adaptive. But Hamilton disagreed. In his classic 1975 paper, ‘Innate social aptitudes of man: An approach from evolutionary genetics’, he discarded the notion that inclusive fitness processes can only operate between genealogical kin, and argued that altruism can be adaptive between anonymous, genetically similar individuals.

“[C]onnections which the remote townsman does not so easily know of make up in multiplicity what they lack in close degree” (1975, p. 142).

By townsman Hamilton means the member of a band or tribe. He showed mathematically that even with a steady trickle of migration between populations, relatedness can rise as high as 0.5 between random members. Hamilton concluded that altruism on behalf of the group could then be adaptive, especially if it preserved the group from replacement. The point that inclusive fitness processes can operate between individuals merely on the basis of genetic similarity, without any genealogical information, is critical, and I quote Hamilton’s commentary on this theoretical advance.

“Because of the way it was first explained [by Hamilton], the approach using inclusive fitness has often been identified with “kin selection” and presented strictly as an alternative to “group selection” as a way of establishing altruistic social behaviour by natural selection. But…kinship should be considered just one way of getting positive regression of genotype in the recipient, and that it is this positive regression that is vitally necessary for altruism. Thus the inclusive fitness concept is more general than “kin selection” ” (Hamilton 1975, pp. 140-41; [p. 337 in the 1996 reprint]).

This frees the analyst from the “identical by descent” clause in Hamilton’s original (1964) formulation, allowing the direct measurement of kinship processes using genetic assay data. These data are usually expressed not in terms of kinship coefficients, but genetic variation, for example FST. However, Harpending (1979) provides a formula for converting FST measures to kinship coefficients.

fo = FST + (1 – FST)[ – 1/(2N – 1)]

where fo is the local kinship coefficient, FST the variance of the metapopulation, and N the overall population. Within primordial dialect groups and tribes, where N is approximately 500, the second complex term in this equation is small. When N is large, as it usually is with modern ethnies, a good approximation for the above equation becomes, simply:


(The kinship concept needs clarification. In population genetics the coefficient of kinship, f, between two individuals is defined as the probability that an allele taken randomly from one will be identical to an allele taken at the same locus from another. This definition is close to that of Hamilton’s (1964) original coefficient of relatedness r, which he used in his classic formulation of inclusive-fitness theory, except that in simple cases 2f = r. This means that parental kinship is 0.25, not 0.5. Kinship to self is 0.5, not the familiar 1.0, which refers to relatedness r. A fuller explanation is provided in Salter [in press])

Harpending’s simple formula allows the estimation of average kinship within local populations based on FST measures. The principle can be simply stated thus: variation between two populations is equal to kinship within each of them. As a hypothetical example, if the variation between two groups P and Q is FST = 0.25, then the kinship between two randomly-chosen members of P is likewise 0.25, or that of sibs or parent and child. The same applies to random pairs drawn from Q.

This brings us to the subject of this presentation: Was there sufficient genetic variation between primordial human groups for individual inclusive fitness to be boosted by acts of ethnic solidarity, by patriotism?

Let’s begin with the band, numbering between 30 and 50 individuals, comprised of two or three extended families connected by marriage ties. I could not locate data on inter-band genetic variation, but Harpending (personal communication) reports that inter-band FST is typically small, 0.01 or less. Let us assume, for illustrative purposes, that it is 0.0005. If, apart from extended family, a band numbered, say, 25 individuals, then this group’s aggregate kinship to a random individual is 0.0005 x 25 = 0.0025, which is the equivalent of one hundredth of a child. This number only has meaning in the context of competition with a neighbouring band. It will be much higher in the context of competition with more genetically distant populations. By comparison to this vanishingly small kinship, an individual’s genealogical kin might represent the genetic equivalent of five or six children (3 actual children plus cousins, grandchildren, etc.). The selection advantage of altruism towards nonkin would usually be outweighed by altruism towards kin. Nevertheless, band solidarity might have paid off because the fate of the extended family was inseparably bound up with the fate of the band. The average kinship with the band would have been high relative to the average kinship with members of neighbouring bands. (An approximation: assume that family plus others yield the equivalent of six children within the band, or an aggregate kinship of 1.5. Then average kinship is 1.5/50 = 0.03. Average kinship with neighbouring bands is –0.01.)

Genetic variation grows with the geographic scale of population units, so that dialect and tribal populations have higher kinship between random pairs than do bands. Typical variation between small dialect groups and tribes might be 0.005. FST between clusters of Bantu tribes is much higher, typically about 0.015. Between West African populations Fst varies from 0.0013 (Ewe-Volta) to 0.049 (Volta-Wolof). The average is about 0.02 (Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994, p. 181). Neighbouring American Indian tribes have a typical genetic distance of about 0.025 (Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994, p. 323). The Americas show high genetic variability, with an average FST of 0.070, compared to Australia’s 0.019, Polynesia’s 0.031, New Guinea’s 0.039, sub-Saharan Africa’s 0.035, and Caucasoid’s as a whole of 0.043 (Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994, p. 336).

Genetic variation continues to increase with geographical , though recall that we are discussing autochthonous populations, those that have been resident in an area for many thousands of years. Cavalli-Sforza et al (1994, p. 122) have charted the relationship between FST and distance within large regions.



Fig. 1  The relationship between genetic distance and geographic distance within continents. Note that the curves are based on pre-colonial populations (from Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994, p. 122).


Between continents genetic variation increases greatly. Table 1 shows the FST distances between geographical races, which can be characterized as continental-scale populations.

Africans 0.0
Non-European Caucasoids 1340 0.0
European Caucasoids 1656 155 0.0
Northeast Asians 1979 640 938 0.0
Arctic Northeast Asians 2009 708 747 460 0.0
Amerindians 2261 956 1038 747 577 0.0
Southeast Asians 2206 940 1240 631 1039 1342 0.0
Pacific Islanders 2505 954 1345 724 1181 1741 437 0.0
New Guineans and Australians 2472 1179 1346 734 1013 1458 1238 809


Table 1. Genetic variation between nine geographical races, measured as FST x 10,000 (From Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1994, p. 80; rounded to nearest integers; standard errors omitted).

Inter-racial variation is typically as high as 0.125 or even 0.25 (between Pacific Islanders and Africans). In the latter case, intra-racial kinship is the equivalent of parental kinship. Higher variation across greater geographical distances means that populations organized competitively over those distances have higher within-population kinship. At the same time, aggregate kinship will increase due to the larger size of the polity. In other words, other factors being equal, group solidarity becomes more adaptive as the scale of political organization grows. In Table 2 I estimate the aggregate kinship in child-equivalents for different types of populations. The values differ for each continent, but the FST values adopted are realistic.

Child equivalents
N Inter-pop. FST Extended family kinship Non-family group members
Band 50 0.0005 5
Dialect group 500 0.005 5 10
Large tribe 5000 0.01 5 200
Modern nation 10 mill. 0.015 5 600,000
Racially different nations 10 mill. 0.125 5 5 mill.

Table 2.  Distribution of aggregate kinship in different sized autochthonous populations based on genetic distance to neighbouring populations of the same kind.


Table 2 indicates that beyond the band, ethnic solidarity could have been adaptive, assuming that competition existed between the larger social units, that free riders were controlled and that collective goods existed in which to invest.

From the emergence of tribes in the Neolithic, social organization spanning many miles would have created scope for collective goods that benefited many hundred or thousands of individuals. The positive relationship between geographic and genetic distance would have created an adaptive opportunity for aggressively expansive group strategies, perhaps in the autocatalytic process postulated by E. O. Wilson:

“A band might then dispose of a neighboring band, appropriate its territory, and increase its own genetic representation in the metapopulation, retaining the tribal memory of this successful episode, repeating it, increasing the geographical range of its occurrence, and quickly spreading its influence still further in the metapopulation. Such primitive cultural capacity would be permitted by the possession of certain genes” (E. O. Wilson 1975, p. 573).

Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1982) makes essentially the same point, by emphasizing group cohesion and territorial displacement. Likewise Hamilton combined the factors of aggressive territorial expansion.

“[P]rimate examples suggest the prototype war party as an all-male group, brothers and kin, practised as a team in successful hunting and at last redirecting its skill towards usurping the females or territory of another group. Out of such cells can be built the somewhat less stable organism of the postneolithic army. . . . If the male war party has been adaptive for as long as is surmised here, it is hardly surprising that a similar grouping often reappears spontaneously even in circumstances where its present adaptive value is low or negative, as in modern teenage gangs.” (Hamilton 1975, p. 148)

The key elements in the strategy would have been capturing territory and replacing the conquered population in whole or part. Ethnic nepotism in the form of advancing such a strategy or defending against it would have yielded fitness payoffs much larger, though less regularly, than familial nepotism.

The Hamilton-Harpending algorithm offers an analytical tool for estimating whether a population was (or is) a fit object for altruism, and thus whether that altruism was (or is) sustainable across evolutionary time.

Combining inclusive fitness theory with gene assay data has implications for the debate regarding group selection of altruism directed towards ethnies. Research attention long focused on the possibilities of group selection of altruism should be widened to look for the preconditions for extended kin selection: ethnic kinship; control of free riders; and the availability of collective goods facilitating ethnic continuity.


 Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (1992). Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethology and Sociobiology, 13: 171-195.

Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., Menozzi, P. and Piazza, A. (1994).  The history and geography of human genes. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.

Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. (1982). Warfare, man’s indoctrinability and group selection. Ethology (Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie), 60: 177-98.

Goetze, D. (1998). Evolution, mobility, and ethnic group formation. Politics and the Life Sciences, 17(1): 59-71.

Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetic evolution of social behavior, parts 1 and 2. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7: 1-51.

Hamilton, W. D. (1975). Innate social aptitudes of man: An approach from evolutionary genetics. In Biosocial anthropology, (ed. R. Fox), pp. 133-55. Malaby Press, London.

Harpending, H. (1979). The population genetics of interactions. American Naturalist, 113: 622-30.

Salter, F. K. (2002). Estimating ethnic genetic interests: Is it adaptive to resist replacement migration? Population and Environment, 24(2): 111-40.

Wilson, E. O. (1975).  Sociobiology: The new synthesis. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

Australia’s humanitarian (refugee) program 2016-2017

Submission to the Federal Government’s pre-budget consultations[i]

Frank Salter, 27 March 2016

I am a political scientist with a specialty in ethnic diversity and conflict. I have published research on the effects of ethnic diversity in relation to multiculturalism, welfare, and organised crime, in addition to ethical dimensions.[ii]

Australia’s refugee program has become so large and permanent that, per capita, it surpasses in scale many countries’ normal immigration intakes. Yet the Government’s policy is to increase the base level intake from 13,750 to 18,750 by 2018-2019, which does not include the planned special intake of 12,000 Syrians in 2016-2017. Australia is taking in refugees at the rate of 1% of its population every 17 years, soon to be every 13 years. This is not a new situation. In 1986 Australia was already taking more refugees for permanent settlement than any other country, 8 per 1000 population, or 1% of Australia’s population every 13 years.[iii]

The refugee intake is so large that it constitutes a form of immigration, though of an exceptional kind. Cumulatively, our refugee intake is sufficiently large to affect economic performance, community identity, and social stability. But compared to many normal immigrants, refugees are not generally screened for economic and social compatibility. However imperfect the regular immigration program – and it has deficiencies – its selection criteria protect Australia’s way of life much better than those applied to refugees.

This submission will argue that as presently configured in size and makeup, Australia’s refugee intake is having negative impacts on those variables. A fundamental rethink is needed to make the humanitarian program compatible with national security and social cohesion.

The submission consists of the following parts:

  • General costs of ethno-religious diversity;
  • Specific costs of diversity caused by the present refugee program;
  • Australia’s social fragmentation and government’s ahistorical rhetoric;
  • Refugee advocacy organizations;
  • Policy recommendations.


General costs of ethno-religious diversity

As presently configured, Australia’s refugee program is contributing to Australia’s ethno-religious diversity. To understand the special costs imposed by refugees, it is necessary to be familiar with the state of sociological research into the general costs of ethnic diversity. “Ethnicity” is often misunderstood. In this submission I adopt the mainstream definition which includes the following elements: a named population sharing belief in descent from common ancestors, a shared history, and sharing distinctive elements of culture, which usually includes religion.[iv] Thus ethnicity is simultaneously conditioned by history and culture and beliefs about shared descent.

A full analysis of the impacts of ethnic diversity is beyond the scope of the present submission, though a summary and sources are available in my recent analysis of the European refugee crisis.[v] In that analysis I summarise the social impact of rising ethno-religious diversity under six headings: rising social conflict; more crime from some immigrant groups; weakened social welfare net; greater ethnic inequality; racialised politics; and reduced civil liberties. Some of these headings are discussed below.

Numerous studies that compare societies around the world show that as diversity rises, social cohesion and trust tend to fall. At the same time, ethnic conflict occurs more frequently. The best known academic study of the costs of diversity was published by Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam in 2007.[vi] Putnam surveyed a large sample of US citizens in many cities. He found that diversity undermined social capital, which consists of neighbours participating in group social activities, helping and trusting one another. These findings have not always been replicated at the national level, but refined methods have confirmed the results at the neighbourhood level.[vii]

A converging series of studies using biosocial theory and methods preceded and confirmed Putnam’s finding, while adding the dimensions of inter-ethnic conflict, degraded welfare and economic measures.[viii] A recent confirmation by Finnish sociologist Tatu Vanhanen compared rates of ethnic conflict in 176 societies in the year 2010. Conflict was broadly defined, to include discrimination, the formation of ethnic parties and interest groups (racialised politics), as well as ethnic violence and civil war. Vanhanen found that ethnic diversity explained 66% of global variation in ethnic conflict, while other variables, such as per capita income, level of human development, and level of democratization, explained only 6 to 16% of the variation. In other words, much of the difference between united peaceful countries and those riven by ethnic conflict is the latters’ ethnic diversity.

Australia is not immune from the costs of diversity. Repeated studies by Australian academics find that ethnic diversity undermines social capital. An example is research conducted by Andrew Leigh, professor of economics at the Australian National University before becoming Labor’s Shadow Assistant Treasurer.[ix] Another example is work done by Professor Andrew Markus, at Monash University, who manages the Scanlon Foundation surveys of social cohesion, conducted since 2007. The surveys find that areas of high immigration settlement undergo a loss of social trust and other measures of cohesion. “This finding supports Putnam’s interpretation that ethnic diversity has a significant negative impact on social cohesion.” [x]

One cost of diversity deserving attention is the loss of civil liberties. In immigrant societies governments come under pressure to suppress “hate speech”, which can include statements of opinion and fact. In Australia Section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act allows prosecution of individuals who state something “reasonably likely … to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or a group of people” based on their “race, colour or national or ethnic origin”. The Section has been used by some minorities to silence their critics. And several minority leaders combined to defeat the Abbott government’s attempt to reform Section 18C in order to continue silencing critics.[xi] Whether or not one agrees with such legislation it is evidence of ethnic conflict.

Specific costs of diversity caused by the present refugee program

These costs of diversity are magnified by the refugee intake because refugees are not selected to suit Australia’s needs. The points system and employer nominations used to select many regular immigrants reduces the diversity of the intake by nationality and class, compared to what would result from random selection of immigrants from around the world.[xii] English language is an advantage in the points-tested independent sub-programs of the skilled intake, and in most of the other sub-programs of the skilled intake, as is possession of occupational skills. It is more difficult to acquire these skills in countries in developing economies, such as are common in Africa and the Middle East and parts of Asia. At the same time societies with small middle classes are more prone to authoritarian regimes and civil wars, major causes of refugee flows. As a result of these factors, a much higher proportion of refugees find it difficult to find work or fit into society in Australia. They are more likely to come from Africa and the Middle East, and more likely to be Muslims, increasing Australia’s ethno-religious diversity more rapidly (per capita intake) than does normal immigration.

Also relevant is evidence that conflict is intensified when the antagonistic parties have different religions.[xiii] The resulting dysfunction has been inflicted on working class suburbs in the large cities.

The result is that refugees and their descendants are more prone to indigence and crime, especially those from Africa and the Middle East. One only need follow the news to document the harm done. Recently Sudanese and Pacific Islander[xiv] youth rioted in Melbourne (Saturday 12 March 2016), overwhelming police. There were similar riots in Melbourne by African youth on New Year in 2014, when Salvation Army staff described the situation as resembling a “war zone”. Most of the Africans originate from refugees taken in from Sudan and other trouble spots in Africa. Sudan is a largely Muslim society. Further back, another problem group has been Lebanese Muslims whose parents were accepted as refugees by the Fraser government in the 1980s. The result has been chronic unemployment and criminality, including the tribal pack rapes of Anglo girls.[xv]

Problems with integrating Sudanese were admitted by Kevin Andrews, the Immigration Minister in the Howard Government, in 2007. The Sudanese intake was reduced before all applications from Africa were suspended for a year. This was in response to problems with Somali refugees, also Muslims. At the time Andrews explained that “some groups don’t seem to be settling and adjusting into the Australian way of life as quickly as we would hope”. That has proven to be an understatement. These examples of poor integration by African and Arab refugees continue to scar Australian communities. They were grievous errors of judgment by governments on both sides of politics.

The fallout from bad refugee policy is a real and continuing threat. NSW Police Deputy Commissioner Nick Kaldas, the senior officer responsible for diversity issues, warned in August 2015 that terrorism was a real possibility wherever Muslim communities develop. He pointed out that the terror threat was not limited to big cities, but to emerging “Middle Eastern” communities in regional centres, such as Newcastle, Wollongong, Coffs Harbour, Wagga and Dubbo. He was especially concerned about refugees, young men who had fled conflict zones such as Somalia, Afghanistan and the Middle East. They were especially vulnerable to being recruited by criminals and extremists, he said. The risk posed by these communities would remain for generations, Kaldas stated.[xvi] Kaldas did not explain why Middle Eastern refugee groups pose the greatest risk, why they suffer economic and educational failure, nor why they will remain such a persistent threat to their local communities and to Australia. Such analysis is not part of the policing function. But it is critical to the formulation of prudent policy.

No wonder Australian public opinion has hardened against illegal immigrants. It is also becoming more negative towards legal immigration, especially of Muslims.[xvii] According to a qualitative survey of 1,349 respondents conducted by the Australian Institute for Progress, in 2015 only 8% of citizens thought that Muslim immigration had been good for Australia. Forty eight percent thought it had been bad for Australia.[xviii] That this is a selective reaction against Muslims is indicated by the previously mentioned Scanlon Surveys, which found in 2014 that 11.5% of respondents in immigrant areas expressed strongly negative attitudes towards Muslims, but only 2% were similarly critical of Buddhists.[xix]

This negative reaction to Muslims is not only or largely due to terrorism. It is mostly due to a failure to integrate into Australian society and economy. The problem was described by journalist Greg Sheridan in 2011, well before home-grown Islamic terrorism took its first victims.[xx] Until then Sheridan had been a leading exponent of multiculturalism and the diverse immigration that feeds it. Sheridan reported many examples of anti-social behavior by Muslim Australians in his neighbourhood near the Lakemba Mosque, in Sydney. These included racially-motivated attacks against Anglo Australians. He interviewed a senior police officer who reported that Arabs in the Lakemba area of Sydney presented a severe policing problem, with high rates of violent crime.

Like the other costs of ethno-religious diversity, restricted civil liberties can also be attributed disproportionately to Australia’s refugee intake. Groups that feel especially threatened by Islamist extremism are lobbying for ever tighter restrictions on racial vilification. In October 2015, six ethnic and cultural organizations joined with the peak Jewish organization in NSW to call for stronger criminal sanctions to be applied against expressions of racial hatred. This was in response to the NSW authorities’ failure to prosecute a leader of the Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir, who sermonised that Muslims should engage in jihad to “rid” the world of “Jewish hidden evil”.[xxi] None of the six complainant organizations was Islamic or Arabic, indicating that the immigrant community has become polarised between two camps, Muslims and non-Muslims. As we have seen, the growth of the Muslim community is significantly accelerated by Australia’s large refugee intake. Stiffening laws against racial hatred seems common sense for citizens subjected to virulent verbal attacks, which could incite violence. Unfortunately the effect is to limit freedom of speech, a basic civil liberty. Organic social cohesion is far preferable to that imposed by coercive social controls, such as the Racial Discrimination Act, its Orwellian section 18C, and the associated apparatus of commissioners and courts. But natural cohesion requires vigilance in selecting immigrants and refugees.

Financial costs are also special to refugees. Beyond the substantial cost of training, housing and welfare is the need to invest in infrastructure. In a modern society such as Australia, infrastructure includes not only water, gas, electricity, and telecom lines, but power generation, schools and teachers, roads, police and courts. Economist Jane O’Sullivan estimates those costs to total more than $100,000 for every new citizen.[xxii] These costs apply to all immigrants but those admitted under the general program are likely to begin to repay those costs not long after arriving. A much lower proportion of refugees become productive members of the workforce. Many never pay into the system. Australians should be informed that their largesse towards refugees as presently chosen not only has severe social impacts, but financial ones also.

This has resulted from the policy of excluding a significant fraction of Australia’s immigration intake, the 5-10% made up of humanitarian cases, from responsible selection criteria.

Australia’s social fragmentation and government’s ahistorical rhetoric

The present Federal Government implicitly admitted to a crisis in social cohesion when, in 2014-2015, it consulted the public on how citizenship might be used to reduce Islamic terrorism. Those who wrote the discussion paper were ambitious. They demanded that citizenship, a legalistic concept, should alone be sufficient to foster love of country and respect for other Australians. The paper was full of the usual multicultural platitudes, such as: “As a nation, we have found unity in our diversity and respect in our differences.” Continued immigration was “non-negotiable”, the paper declared.[xxiii]

Readers might never guess that the same fallacious citizenship doctrine – that legal statutes can substitute for organic ties developed over centuries – allowed the social fragmentation being experienced by Australia and many other Western societies. The paper did not let on that homegrown terrorists had attacked police and civilians in Melbourne and Sydney, that security agencies had warned that further attacks were probable, that hardened jihadist fighters would be returning to Australia from the Middle East, that the NSW police expert on diversity issues believed the threat from radicalised Muslims would last for generations, that surveys had shown that the more diverse a suburb the lower its occupants’ sense of security and cohesion, and that the negative reaction of third-generation Australians against Muslims was especially strong.[xxiv] The authors of the paper did not connect these many signs of an unravelling society with immigration and multicultural policies, the overt racialisation of electoral politics, or with decades of high refugee intakes. The authors – the Australian Government – were clueless about the relevance of Australia’s falling level of volunteering[xxv] and about the difference between a nation and a (political) state.[xxvi]

The same ideology – a version of citizenism – was part and parcel of the multicultural experiment initiated by the Fraser government in the 1970s against the will of the Australian people, that has given us rising social chaos and home-grown terrorism, where young people born and raised in Australia join overseas terrorist groups. It is no coincidence that the same Fraser government initiated a permanent refugee intake coordinated with the United Nations.

It should be noted that Australia ratified the UN Refugee Convention in 1954, at a time when people smugglers and long-distance flows of refugees were almost unknown. It is widely acknowledged among responsible analysts that the UN Convention is a failure, that it is undermining the national interests of receiving nations and promoting people smugglers.[xxvii] By handing over some control to the UN, a body with a long track record of anti-Western bias, Australia has yielded control of an important part of its immigration program to people who do not share our national interests.

Poor governance of refugee issues has been associated with rhetoric divorced from history. In initiating the consultation over the humanitarian intake, the Minister for Immigration, the Hon. Peter Dutton, boasted of the success of Australia’s original refugee program, after WWII, implying that we should continue to accept large intakes from around the world. As noted earlier, the Government has announced that our already high intake will be increased to 18,750 places by 2018-19 (again, not including the special intake of 12,000 Syrians).[xxviii] Dutton did not note that the post-WWII program was made to conform with the selection criteria applied to immigrants at that time. Refugees were chosen to be culturally assimilable. In other words, the refugee intake was made part of the immigration program. The abandonment of that principle in the 1970s had dangerous social consequences for Australia, contributing to a rapid rise in ethno-religious diversity, the transformation of cohesive local communities and rising levels of ethnic conflict.

Refugee advocacy organizations

The Minister deserves praise for opening up the humanitarian program to democratic consultation. For too long the process has been an elite conclave, “conducted in quiet consultation with refugee, church and ethnic community groups”.[xxix] Ian Rintoul, spokesman for the Refugee Action Coalition, is worried that allowing the public to express its views might introduce a proposal to reduce intake numbers. Fear of the public is understandable, because consultations have been monopolised by individuals and organization who act as advocates for refugees, without taking into consideration the interests of the Australian people. Neither have governments seen fit to include in the consultation process bodies that place Australia’s interests first. This has been the case since the 1980s or earlier, and helps explain the extremity of refugee policy since that time. To better make this point, this section examines perhaps the most important refugee advocacy body, the Refugee Council of Australia.

The Refugee Council is the peak non-government agency focusing on refugees. It is typical of bodies supporting generous humanitarian intakes. It holds a privileged position in the consultation process, being invited annually since 1984 by federal governments to provide advice on policy for the upcoming year.[xxx] The RCOA boasts of consulting with stakeholders around Australia on the needs of refugees, how Australia might better meet their needs, for example in the post-arrival settlement process, and how large the intake should be.

Striking – by its absence – is any consideration of how refugees harm Australia or consultation with bodies motivated to provide relevant information. The RCOA treats its role as advocacy for refugees, unqualified by concern for Australia. They promote ever larger refugee intakes in an open-ended manner. For example, in September 2015 the RCOA president, Phil Glendenning, criticised Australia for not taking an additional 20,000 refugees from Syria, despite this country having one of the most generous resettlement program on a per capita basis in the world. He accused Australia of having a special responsibility to open its borders to refugees because it indirectly contributed to the war in Syria, ignoring the fact that Australian forces were deployed against the terrorists. He praised Germany for taking in almost one million refugees, implying that doing so was responsible policy. These views went uncorrected by the ABC interviewer.[xxxi] RCOA and the ABC were engaged in advocacy for refugees, not formulating responsible policy that treats Australia and other Western societies as stakeholders with real interests to protect.

A responsible approach that balances refugee interests with those of the Australian people is left to the Federal Government. But until recently no government, from either side of politics, has sought out advice from those who advocate for Australian national interests. It is a scandalous record. To its credit, the present Coalition government cut funding to the RCOA in 2014 after belatedly realizing it to be an advocacy group. The powerful interests behind the body maintained its core revenues of $888,000 in the 2015 financial year.[xxxii] The Government is now opening consultation to allow the public to voice opinions.

In 2015 the RCOA had over 200 institutional members.[xxxiii] These included a cross-section of humanitarian bodies, with human rights bodies and churches well represented. There was also a large number of ethnic lobbies, consisting of 45 pro-immigration and pro-multiculturalism groups, advocating for minority ethnic groups, and 21 ethnic associations which also advocate for non-Anglo minorities.[xxxiv] It is remarkable that not one member organization represents the Australian majority or the Australian national interest. Why is protecting Australians not considered a humanitarian goal? Equally remarkable is the moral contradiction that allows humanitarians to work cheek by jowl with tribally-motivated ethnocentrists, who are interested mainly in benefiting a particular people or group of peoples. These ethnic activists pay lip service to universalist ideals but their ethnic organizations have very different motivations to their Christian and other humanitarian allies. For the multicultural lobby, humanitarian rhetoric is often a vehicle for advancing ethnic interests. They are happy that the same vehicle rides roughshod over Australians’ national sentiments, which they view as tribal competition. But how, in good conscience, can the genuine humanitarians in the RCOA facilitate tribal aggression, especially when directed against their own nation? The RCOA appears to be morally corrupt and disloyal to Australia, yet is the peak NGO advising on refugee policy; it is treated with respect by the mainstream media and politicians.

Policy recommendations

The Government’s briefing paper asks those making submissions to answer detailed questions concerning refugee policy.[xxxv] This assumes an insider’s knowledge of the system, which is unfair to most Australians wishing to express an opinion. It is also inappropriate that the questions do not canvass opposition to the system as a whole.

Instead of answering these questions in detail, I shall recommend broad principles for reforming the refugee program, and note those principles’ likely impact.

In the foregoing analysis I have argued that the refugee intake constitutes a sizable immigration program in its own right. That program’s exemption from normal immigration criteria has harmed the fabric of Australia’s society. Governments should put Australia’s national interests first.

Any sizeable refugee intake – more than dozens annually – should be subjected to the same criteria that have been relatively successful in choosing peaceful, productive immigrants. Any improvements made to the normal immigration program would then automatically flow onto selection of refugees.

Australia should withdraw from the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and work towards a new agreement that respects national interests.[xxxvi] In addition, the planned intake of 12,000 Syrian refugees should be reassessed. The Government has belatedly indicated its intention of allocating most places to non-Muslim minorities but that degree of selectivity falls short of the criteria applied to immigrants.

The effect of applying immigration-standard criteria will be drastically to reduce the refugee intake. Some of the resulting savings, which will be large, should be switched to funding humanitarian assistance overseas, especially in our region.

A practical and moral consideration in deciding refugee policy is the very large numbers involved. By the end of 2014, UNHCR estimated that, globally, there were 59.5 million people displaced as a result of persecution, conflict, generalised violence or human rights violations. Of these, 19.5 million were classed as refugees (i.e. outside their country of origin), 38.2 million as internally displaced, and about 1.8 million were asylum seekers. To those numbers must be added those economic migrants who pose as humanitarian cases. A large fraction of the million-plus individuals who entered Europe in 2015 during the Syrian crisis were not from Syria, but from Africa, Lebanon, Afghanistan, even as far away as Pakistan.

This continuing humanitarian disaster confronts those with good will. Given that resources are limited, should a tiny number of cases be raised to the pinnacle of living conditions offered by citizenship in a first world economy, or should a much larger number, many hundreds of times larger, be given emergency aid in or near their countries of origin. Australian governments have adopted the first option, the luxury option, at the cost of abandoning millions to their fate and diminishing the security and cohesion of their own society.

Where legally feasible, recent refugee intakes should be reversed, with individuals who have not yet become citizens being placed overseas by a dedicated bureaucracy. A truly humanitarian program must take into account the security, prosperity and unity of the Australian people.



[i], accessed 19 Feb. 2016.

[ii] Salter, F. K., Ed. (2002). Risky transactions. Trust, kinship, and ethnicity. Oxford and New York, Berghahn.

Salter, F. K., Ed. (2004). Welfare, ethnicity, & altruism: New data & evolutionary theory. London, Frank Cass.

Salter, F. K. (2008). “Westermarck’s altruism: Charity releasers, moral emotions, and the welfare ethic.” Politics and the Life Sciences 27(2): 28-46.

See Frank Salter’s experience and publications at:

[iii] World Refugee Survey, US Committee for Refugees, 1986. As reported by John Masanauskas (1990). “What to do with the world’s refugees?”, The Age, 14 June.

[iv] Smith, A. D. (1986). The ethnic origins of nations. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, pp. 22-30.

[v] Salter, F. K. (2016). Germany’s jeopardy: Could the immigrant influx “end European civilization”?, Social Technologies,, 6 January.

[vi] Putnam, R. D. (2007). “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize lecture.” Scandinavian Political Studies 30: 137-174.

[vii] Laurence, J. and L. Bentley (2015). “Does ethnic diversity have a negative effect on attitudes towards the community? A longitudinal analysis of the causal claims within the ethnic diversity and social cohesion debate.” European Sociological Review.

[viii] Salter (2002; 2004), op cit.

[ix] Leigh, A. (2006). “Diversity, trust and redistribution.” Dialogue: Academy of Social Sciences in Australia 25(3): 43-49.

The finding was confirmed by:

Healy, E. (2007). “Ethnic diversity and social cohesion in Melbourne.” People and Place 15(4): 49-64.

[x] Markus, Andrew (2012). 2012 Scanlon Survey, Local Areas Report, p. 21.

[xi] Salter, F. K. (2014). Section 18C, multiculturalism and power. Quadrant Online.

[xii] The regular immigration program is more amenable to national interests despite serious shortcomings. New Zealand immigrants enter freely with minimal screening, due to the special relationship between the two countries. The growing social and economic incompatibilities of Pacific Islanders in Australia originates from this lack of selection. Another deficiency in the regular immigration program is that the points-based component of the general intake has been reduced in favour of employer nominations, which opens the process to corruption. See:

Birrell, B., E. Healy, et al. (2011). Immigration and the resources boom mark 2. Melbourne, Centre for Population and Urban Research: 49 pp.,

Also, many skilled migrants from non-English speaking countries (NESC) are slow to find employment in their fields of specialization. Indeed, a major component of the NESC program, students who have studied in Australia, are the least successful in finding employment in their professions. See:

Birrell, B. and E. Healy (2008). “How are skilled migrants doing?” People and Place 16(1): Supplement, 19 pp.

[xiii] Rummel, R. J. (1997). “Is collective violence correlated with social pluralism?”Journal of Peace Research 34(3): 163-176.

[xiv] Most Pacific Islanders come to Australia from New Zealand, and thus are not screened for economic or social compatibility.

[xv] Martin Chulov, “Rape menace from the melting pot”, The Weekend Australian, 18-19 August 2001.

[xvi] Dan Box, “Police set sights on extremist risk in regional migrant communities”, The Australian, 13 Aug. 2015, p. 7., accessed 24 Feb. 2016.

[xvii] 2012 Scanlon Survey, Local Areas Report, p. 30.

[xviii] Young, G. (2015). Australian attitudes to immigration. Brisbane, Australian Institute for Progress: 33 pp.,, p. 22. Accessed 20 March 2016.

[xix] 2014 Scanlon Local Area Survey, p. 4.

[xx] Sheridan, G. (2011). How I lost faith in multiculturalism. The Australian. Sydney, News Limited.

[xxi] Anthony Klan, “Ethnic push to boost race hate laws”, The Australian, 2 Oct. 2015, p. 2., accessed 24 Feb. 2016.

[xxii] O’Sullivan, J. (2012). “The burden of durable asset acquisition in growing populations.” Economic Affairs(February): 31-37.

O’Sullivan, J. (2015). Submission to the Productivity Commission’s Inquiry into migrant intake into Australia. Brisbane,

[xxiii] Discussion paper: Australian citizenship – Your right, your responsibility.

[xxiv] 2014 Scanlon Local Area Survey, op cit., p. 4.

[xxv] Volunteers decline for the first time: Australian Bureau of Statistics”, SMH 3 July 2015.–australian-bureau-of-statistics-20150703-gi47cw.html

[xxvi] Salter, F. K. (2015). Towards a Ministry of Emigration – Australian citizenship and domestic terrorism. Submission to government inquiry into Citizenship Policy, conducted by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. Canberra,

[xxvii] Khalid Koser (2015). “Australia and the 1951 Refugee Convention” Lowy Institute for International Policy. 30 April., accessed 20 March 2016.

[xxviii] Jared Owens, “Public input invited on refugee intake size”, The Australian, 18 Feb. 2016, p. 5.

[xxix] Owens, op cit.

[xxx], accessed 19 Feb. 2016.

The 2015 submission:

One-sided advocacy is also evident in its 2001 submission: file:///C:/Users/Frank/Desktop/http—, accessed 19 Feb. 2016.

[xxxi], accessed 19 Feb. 2016.

[xxxii], accessed 19 Feb. 2016.

Refugee Council of Australia Financial Statements for year ended June 2015:, accessed 19 Feb. 2016.

[xxxiii] Refugee Council of Australia Annual Report 1014/15, pp. 13-14., accessed 19 Feb. 2016.

[xxxiv] The count is based on organisations’ names.

[xxxv] Questions asked of the public by the government’s briefing paper.

  1. In your view, how many places should Australia attribute to the offshore component of its Humanitarian Programme?
  2. What do you think should be the proportion split between the Special Humanitarian Programme and Refugee categories in the offshore component of its Humanitarian Programme?
  3. To which regions (Africa, Asia or Middle East) do you think most places should be allocated?
  4. In your view, how important is the Woman at Risk programme?
  5. Should the available places under the Community Proposal Pilot be increased?
  6. Do you have other comments, particularly on the offshore component of the 2016-17 Programme?

[xxxvi] Reforming the 1951 Refugee Convention is proposed by Koser, op cit.

Constraints on human behavior and the biological nature of man

Frank Salter, 18 March 2016.  The following letter from 1992 had scholarly import but was never published. It reveals some of the nature-nurture debate that has taken place in the specialised field of legal behaviour, in particular with regard to human evolution, innate behaviour, and ethology. The debate continues, though legal studies continues to deny the relevance of biology, as do the humanities and soft social sciences (sociology, cultural anthropology, political science). At the time Hubert Markl (1938-2015) was president of the Max Planck Society, Germany’s peak scientific research organisation, at which I was undertaking post-doctoral research.  My letter responded to the following publication:

Markl, H. (1983). Constraints on human behavior and the biological nature of man. Law, Biology and Culture. The Evolution of Law. M. Gruter and P. Bohannan. Santa Barbara, Ross-Erikson: 90-100.


Prof. Dr. Hubert Markl
Department of Biology
University of Konstanz, Germany

26 Oct. 1992

Dear Prof. Markl,

I’ve just read your chapter “Constraints on human behavior and the biological nature of man” in Gruter and Bohannan (1983), Law, Biology and Culture. The Evolution of Law. In that chapter you argue against the usefulness of biological approaches to the study of legal behaviour. I am working in this area of research and am interested to know whether you still hold the views expressed in that paper.

In case your position is unchanged, let me be so bold as to offer a critique of your paper.

You consider biological contributions to the analysis of legal behaviour to be limited in principle for three reasons. Each of these reasons contains theoretically-based insights which do demonstrate limitations. Of particular power is your refutation of sweeping, general claims by sociobiologists and other evolutionists regarding the innateness of normative and legal behaviour. However, it seems to me that the three points fail to show an overall limitation of biology, broadly defined. Taking each point in turn:

(1) (From your abstract) “Since laws are cognitive constructs of the human mind which must be verbalized to become effective, man is the only species in which legal behaviour can be studied. All inferences from animal behaviour studies and from evolutionary considerations are highly speculative with respect to human legal behaviour.”

It is true that laws are cognitive constructs. Indeed it is appropriate, I think, to see laws as a form of social technology. As such they are not (biologically) evolved individual or social characteristics. And since non-human species do [NOT] have such techniques for formulating social rules, in this sense no cross-species comparison is possible. We cannot compare the legal cultures of, say, chimpanzee and human societies. However, these facts leave considerable room for biological contributions to the analysis of components of legal behaviour which are shared with other species.

Mechanisms of rule-governed behaviour are amenable to cross-species comparisons. Rule behaviour need not involve explicit formulation of rules. Members of a group which is delineated in a dominance hierarchy are displaying a capacity for learning and following rules, since a dominance relationship involves learning from experiences of conflict and applying that knowledge to managing relationship in subsequent interactions. More generally, a great number of species are capable of displaying (and inferring) rules of reinforcement and aversiveness, as countless Pavlovian/Skinnerian experiments have shown. Closer to home, primate studies have shown that chimpanzees and some cercopithecines are capable of inferring complex rules in social relationships. A well known example is Franz de Waal’s (Waal 1982; Waal 1986) studies of chimpanzees, in which he found that mature males used strategic alliances to manage dominance relations. Further, alpha males would establish and enforce self-serving (though unspoken) rules, such as: you must not groom that male!

Triadic dominance has clear application to institutions, particularly to their legal culture. It is no coincidence that all laws specify punishments for violators. In societies with sufficient surplus for group task specialization (ie. civilizations) laws are monitored and enforced by police and judiciary. This legal apparatus is only present in human societies but the behavioural mechanisms, at least as they involve dominance, appear to be comparable. (Of course there are other behavioural and motivational factors: conscience, habit, economics.) Comparison is particularly valuable when it is realized that hunter-collector societies, despite possessing speech and thus being able to articulate rules, lack a legal apparatus. In place of police and judiciary, rules are enforced face-to-face using mechanisms of dominance and affiliation, in a manner comparable to hunter-collector groups of other species.

While it is true that legal systems are not natural, the entities (humans) they manipulate are, and the cues which act to limit and coordinate human behaviour must be simulacra of evolved social signals. That is why the science of social signalling, ethology and biologically-oriented social psychology, are especially well suited to the analysis of legal systems.

(2) “In the ontogenetic development of human behaviour there is adaptation of the behaviour to the environment, including culture. There seems no reliable procedure to factor out their relative contribution, particularly since genetic adaptation can be easily phenocopied. Therefore it is only rarely possible to separate a ‘biological’ component of human behaviour from a ‘cultural’ one.”

With regard to your second point about ontogeny, it would seem that advances in method and theory are overtaking the difficulties of untangling nature from nurture in legal behaviour. Behavioural genetics and behavioural endocrinology are delineating heritable and developmental predictors of crime-related behaviours such as alcohol abuse as well as counter-intuitive characteristics such as political preferences and types of rule-breaking such as petty theft and violence (Bohman, Cloninger et al. 1982; Gabrielli and Mednick 1983; Brennan, Mednick et al. 1986; Ellis 1986; Martin, Eaves et al. 1986; Bain, Langevin et al. 1987; Dabbs, Frady et al. 1987; Mednick, Gabrielli et al. 1987; Dabbs, Ruback et al. 1988; Moffitt and Mednick 1988; Fishbein 1990; Ellis 1991) . The emerging lesson is not the naive one that criminality and lawful conduct are inborn, but that legal regimes set environmental conditions which filter out and classify as criminal categories of people based on their patterns of behaviour which sometimes have biological correlates (eg. propensity to include violence in one’s repertoire of aggressive behaviour rather than verbal insult).

(3) Most theories pertaining to the evolution of behaviour in animals (and more so in man) are ‘weak’ theories with some retrodictive but little predictive power; they allow us to define probable modes for behavioral averages but say little about the behaviour of individuals, which is at issue in legal considerations.”

Any theory which successfully predicts average behaviour must be of relevance to law makers and law enforcement agencies. It follows that the biological study of emotions which finds cross-cultural universals in emotional experience and expression (Izard 1979; Fridlund and Izard 1983; Izard, Kagan et al. 1984; Ekman 1989; Izard 1990) has a contribution to make to legislators and administrators everywhere.

In conclusion, imagine for the sake of argument that there are no innate predispositions for law-abidingness or criminality, that human social behaviour is effectively plastic or culture-based. That would certainly limit the applicability of biological theories of legal behaviour as a special category of behaviour. But it would still leave a major role for biology in analyzing the underlying learning process, its physiological (psychobiological) underpinnings, and at the evolutionary level, the phylogeny of behavioural plasticity. In one sense there would be no such thing as a biology of legal behaviour per se. But the same could be said for any basic discipline: there can be no sociology or psychology of legal behaviour because those disciplines can be applied to any number of social phenomena. On the contrary, we find it sensible to speak of a sociological and a psychological approach to jurisprudence. By analogy, at the minimum, there must be a substantial role for biology in studying legal behaviour as well as other deliberate, planned social phenomena.

But biology’s role is more particular in its relevance to law than that. The basic motivational and emotional mechanisms of rule-governed, including normative, behaviour are species specific, as are the physiological mechanisms and primary expression clusters by which they are signalled. Legal culture varies between societies, but the behavioural building blocks from which these diverse systems are constructed are universal. The architectural analogy can be carried further. The limited variety of building materials is reflected in the limited variety of legal systems. There are many different punishment mechanisms in use, but all systems rely on punishment of one kind or another and to some degree. Likewise, conscience or internalized norms is universal, at least to stable systems.

I hope I haven’t strained your busy schedule too much with this lengthy letter.

Yours sincerely, Frank Salter



Bain, J., R. Langevin, et al. (1987). Sex hormones in murderers and assaulters. Behavioral Science and the Law, 5, 95-101.

Bohman, M., C. . Cloninger, et al. (1982). Predisposition to petty criminality in Swedish adoptees 1. Genetic and environmental heterogeneity. Archives of General Psychiatry, 39, 1233-1241.

Brennan, P., S. A. Mednick, et al. (1986). Congenital determinants of violent and property offending. In The Development and Treatment of Childhood Aggression, (ed. D. Pepler), Erlbaum, New York.

Dabbs, J. M., R. L. Frady, et al. (1987). Saliva testosterone and criminal violence in young adult prison inmates. Psychosomatic Medicine, 49, 174-182.

Dabbs, J. M., R. B. Ruback, et al. (1988). Saliva testosterone and criminal violence among women. Personality and Individual Differences, 9, 269-75.

Ekman, P. (1989). The argument and evidence about universals in facial expressions of emotion. In Handbook of Social Psychophysiology, (ed. H. Wagner and A. Manstead), pp. 143-164. Wiley, New York.

Ellis, L. (1986). Evolution and the nonlegal equivalents of aggressive criminal behavior. Aggressive Behavior, 12, 57-71.

Ellis, L. (1991). Monoamine oxidase and criminality: Identifying an apparent biological marker for antisocial behavior. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 28, 227-251.

Fishbein, D. H. (1990). Biological Perspectives in Criminology. Criminology, 28, 27-72.

Fridlund, A. J. and C. E. Izard (1983). Electromyographic studies of facial expressions of emotions and patterns of emotion. In Social Psychophysiology: A Sourcebook, (ed. J. T. Cacioppo and R. E. Petty), pp. 243-86. Guilford Press, New York.

Gabrielli, W. F. J. and S. A. Mednick (1983). Genetic correlates of criminal behavior. American Behavioral Scientist, 27, 59-74.

Izard, C., E. J. Kagan, et al. (1984). Emotions, Cognition, and Behavior, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Izard, C. E. (1979). Expression of emotions as a transcultural language in social interaction and theatrical performance. In Aspects of Nonverbal Communication, (ed. W. von Raffler-Engle), Swets & Zeitlinger, Amsterdam.

Izard, C. E. (1990). Facial expressions and the regulation of emotions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 487-489.

Martin, N. G., L. J. Eaves, et al. (1986). Transmission of social attitudes. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 83, 4364-4368.

Mednick, S. A., W. F. Gabrielli, et al. (1987). Genetic factors in the etiology of criminal behavior. In The Causes of Crime, (ed. S. A. Mednick, T. E. Moffitt and S. A. Stack), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Moffitt, T. E. and S. A. Mednick, Ed. (1988). Biological Contributions to Crime Causation. Martinus Nijhoff. Dordrecht, The Netherlands.

Waal, F. B. M. d. (1982). Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex Among Apes, Jonathan Cape, London.

Waal, F. B. M. d. (1986). The integration of dominance and social bonding in primates. Quarterly Review of biology, 61, 459-479.

Deutschlands Wagnis: Könnte der Zustrom an Immigranten „Das Ende der europäischen Zivilisation“ sein?

Following is the German translation of “Germany’s Jeopardy”:



Einleitung: Düstere Vorhersagen

Sozialer Konflikt

Mehr Verbrechen

Verringerte Sozialleistungen

Größere ethnische Ungleichheit

Rassisch verformte Politik

Eingeschränkte Bürgerrechte

Nutzen? Argumente für offene Grenzen

Ergebnis: Wagnis. Wird Europa überleben?


Einleitung: Düstere Vorhersagen

Mein Name ist Frank Salter. Ich bin ein australischer Ethologe. Dies bedeutet, dass ich biologische Ansätze in die Untersuchung von Gesellschaft und Politik mit einbeziehe. Ich habe einen Großteil meiner Karriere mit Forschungen an einem Max Planck Institut in Deutschland und mit Lehre dort, in anderen europäischen Ländern und in den USA verbracht. Eines meiner Forschungsgebiete ist ethnische Solidarität und Konflikt sowie die Art und Weise wie dieses Phänomen demokratische Sozialstaaten beeinflusst.

In diesem Vortrag diskutiere ich die düsteren Vorhersagen, die über den massiven Zustrom an Immigranten und Flüchtlingen gemacht worden, welche derzeit noch immer nach Deutschland und in andere europäische Länder aus dem Mittleren Osten, Afrika und Asien einreisen. Viele von ihnen schwärmen nach der Einreise aus und überqueren die alten europäischen Ländergrenzen, welche aufgrund der Schengen-Abkommen nicht mehr bewacht werden. Trotz der Welle guten Willens und Gastfreundschaft, die von Millionen Deutschen und anderen Europäern gezeigt wurde, glauben einige, dass diese Situation zum Ende der europäischen Zivilisation führen könnte. Diese Vorhersagen wurden nicht nur von fremdenfeindlichen Ideologen sondern auch von moderaten Politkern gemacht.

Ein Beispiel ist Tony Abbot, bis vor kurzem der Premierminister Australiens. Bei einer Ansprach in London forderte er die Europäer auf ihre Grenzen zu schließen um einen „katastrophalen Fehler“ zu vermeiden. Er stellte fest, dass der Schutz der Grenzen „einiger Gewalt benötigen wird; er wird massive Logistik und Ausgaben benötigen; er wird an unserem Gewissen nagen – nichtsdestotrotz ist dies der einzige Weg um eine menschliche Welle daran zu hindern sich durch Europa zu ergießen und es vielleicht für immer zu verändern.“ [i]

Eigenartigerweise erklären weder Abbot noch andere Kommentatoren, wieso dieser Zustrom so schädlich sein wird. Das gleiche gilt für Angela Merkels Argument für die Öffnung der Grenzen. Wo war hier die nüchterne Analyse und transparente Beurteilung von Kosten und Nutzen?

In diesem Vortrag versuche ich eine Beurteilung, indem ich Forschungen nachvollziehe, die sich mit der Art und Weise befassen, in welcher ethnische Vielfalt dazu tendiert, sozialen Konflikt und Kriminalität zu vergrößern, soziale Sicherungssysteme zu untergraben, ethnische Ungleichheit zu verschlimmern und bürgerliche Freiheiten auszuhöhlen. Ich vergleiche dann diese Kosten mit den Vorteilen massenhafter Immigration aus der Dritten Welt, die von Angela Merkel und ihren Unterstützern geltend gemacht werden.

Sozialer Konflikt

Tragische Ereignisse in jüngster Zeit, die Angriffe in Paris inklusive, lassen Terrorismus als die offensichtlichste und nächst liegende Bedrohung erscheinen. Die überwiegende Mehrheit der Ankömmlinge sind Muslime. Obwohl die meisten Muslime keine Terroristen sind, sind viel Terroristen Muslime. Generell erhöht zunehmende ethnische Vielfalt die Chance, dass die Eine oder Andere Minderheit die Außenpolitik der Regierung ablehnen wird. Tragödien sind das Ergebnis, wenn auch nur eine kleine Gruppe unzufriedener Individuen Gewalt anwendet.

Allerdings ist Terrorismus höchstwahrscheinlich nicht der wesentliche Schaden, der aus der gegenwärtigen Immigration folgen wird. Der wesentliche Effekt wird das Zerbrechen der psychologischen Bindungen der Nationalität sein, wodurch die Staatsbürgerschaft zu einem ausgehöhlten Legalismus wird. Dies ist so, weil zunehmende ethnische Vielfalt nicht nur mit Gewalt wie Terrorismus und Bürgerkrieg assoziiert wird, sondern mit einem generellen Verlust an sozialem Zusammenhalt. Aber beginnen wir mit der Gewalt.

Fakten aus zahlreichen Studien zeigen, dass umso ethnisch vielfältiger eine Gesellschaft wird, desto mehr das Konfliktrisiko zunimmt und korrespondierend das Formen von Einigkeit schwerer wird. Bürgerkrieg ist unwahrscheinlicher in homogenen Gesellschaften. Forscher haben versucht dieses Risiko zu quantifizieren.

Eine weltweite Studie von Rudolf Rummel an der University of Hawai aus den 1990ern, maß auf welche Weise 109 Größen zu extremer kollektiver Gewalt (Aufstände und Bürgerkriege) zwischen 1932 und 1982 beitrugen; das ist eine Periode von 50 Jahren. Er fand heraus, dass ein Fünftel der Variation in kollektiver Gewalt von nur einer Größe ausgelöst wurde, der Anzahl an ethnischen Gruppen in der Gesellschaft. Konflikte wurden intensiver, wenn die Konfliktparteien verschiedenen Religionen anhingen.[ii] Dieses Ergebnis ist offensichtlich relevant für die gegenwärtige Situation, in der Muslime in ein weites gehend christliches und säkulares Europa strömen.

Eine Studie gegenwärtiger Gesellschaften des finnischen Soziologen Tatu Vanhanen untersuchte ethnische Konflikte mit einer weiter gefassten Definition die Diskriminierung, ethnische Parteien und Interessengruppen, als auch ethnische Gewalt und Bürgerkrieg beinhaltete. Auf Basis evolutionärer Theorie vermutete Vanhanen, das Vielfalt eine Konfliktzunahme auslösen würde. Vanhanen fand heraus, dass unter den 176 Gesellschaften die er untersuchte 2010 zwei Drittel der Variation ethnischer Konflikte durch ethnische Vielfalt erklärt wurde.[iii] In anderen Worten, ein Großteil der Unterschiede zwischen friedlichen Ländern und solchen, die von ethnischen Konflikten gespalten werden, ist die ethnische Vielfalt letzterer.

Eine ähnliche Wirkung von Vielfalt ist verringerte Kooperation und vermindertes „soziales Kapital“, der Umfang in dem Menschen einander unterstützen. Wenn Heterogenität zunimmt, verringert sich die Mitwirkung in Vereinen und Freiwilligen Netzwerken. Menschen werden isoliert  und weniger vertrauensvoll. Diese Wirkung ist am stärksten in Stadtteilen, in denen Menschen verschiedener ethnischer Gruppen erleben.[iv] In anderen Worten: Unwissenheit oder Isolation sind nicht die Ursachen ethnischen Unfriedens, sondern Kontakt mit anderen Kulturen, also auch Ausländern die in ein Heimatterritorium in großer Zahl einreisen.

Die deutsche Regierung sollte die Tendenz ethnischer Vielfalt sozialen Konflikt auszulösen kennen, da diese Tendenz von deutschen Forschungsinstitutionen untersucht wurde. Beispielsweise haben Irenaeus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, ein Professor der Max Planck Gesellschaft und Kollegen wie  Johan van der Dennen, an der Universität von Groningen in den Niederlanden, über Jahrzehnte die Auswirkungen kultureller Vermischung auf Ethnozentrismus und Xenophobie in anonymen Massengesellschaften untersucht. Beide haben gewarnt, dass das Vermischen verschiedener Ethnien im großen Maßstab die soziale Stabilität verringert und den innergesellschaftlichen Frieden bedroht.

Einige der Untersuchungen die ich angeführt habe wurden von evolutionärer Theorie inspiriert. Dies ist ein wichtiger Ansatz der lange aus den Sozialwissenschaften ausgenommen wurde. Die menschliche Psychologie entwickelte sich im Kontext ethnisch homogener Gruppen. Aus dieser Perspektive ist die Vielfalt, die jetzt von modernen Eliten aufgezwungen wird, unnatürlich im evolutionären Zeitmaßstab. Dieses unnatürliche Maß der Vielfalt ist gemäß evolutionärer Theorie verantwortlich für einen Teil der Konflikte. Eine weitere Bestätigung  dieser evolutionären Hypothese ist die Erkenntnis, dass genetische Vielfalt (getrennt von kultureller Vielfalt) mit gesellschaftlichem Konflikt korreliert. Da ethnische Gruppen Reservoire genetischer Ähnlichkeit sind,[v] erhöht die Vermischung solcher Reservoire die genetische Variation innerhalb einer Gesellschaft und verursacht größeren gesellschaftlichen Konflikt, wie neue weltweite Forschungen zeigen.[vi]

Stärkere Ursachen als genetische Vielfalt sind kulturelle, wirtschaftliche und historische Faktoren, welche das Wohlwollen, das Deutsche, Schweden und andere Europäer syrischen Flüchtlingen 2015 entgegenbrachten, erklären. Allerdings können diese Faktoren kurzfristig beträchtlich schwanken, während es viele Generationen dauern kann, bis genetische Ungleichheiten nachlassen.

Mehr Verbrechen

Verbrechen ist ein gesellschaftlicher Konflikt, in welchem der Aggressor das Gesetz bricht. Die Bilanz von nicht-westlichen Immigranten begangener Verbrechen ist nicht beruhigend.

Ein beunruhigender Trend in Frankreich, das Europas größte muslimische Bevölkerung hat, ist die Zunahme von  sog. „no-go areas“, Gebiete die zu betreten sich selbst die Polizei nur in großen Verbänden traut. Außerdem gibt es in Frankreich und Großbritannien öfters Ausschreitungen, die so  umfassend und gewalttätig sind, dass die Polizei die Kontrolle verliert. Diese Zeiträume des Massenkonflikts entsprechen Aufständen.

Wenn sich Bevölkerungsgruppen aus weniger kompatiblen Kulturen absondern und neue Generationen heranwachsen, gibt es den Trend der Ausprägung von Parallelgesellschaften. Großzügige Sozialleistungen und Multikulturalismus verschlimmern die Kriminalität von Immigranten, die oftmals in der zweiten Generation zunimmt.

Zwischen 1997 und 2013 kam es in massivem Maßstab zu organisierter sexueller Ausbeutung weißer Mädchen in der englischen Stadt Rotherham in South Yorkshire, hauptsächlich durch muslimische Männer pakistanischer Abstammung. Bis zu 1400 Mädchen, teilweise nur 12 Jahre alt, wurden durch mehrere Männer vergewaltigt und verschleppt.

Schweden und Dänemark bieten ebenfalls einen Vorgeschmack dessen, was man in Deutschland von der Aufnahme nicht überprüfter Immigranten aus inkompatiblen Kulturen erwarten kann. Die Mehrheit der in Schweden des Mordes, der Vergewaltigung und des Raubes angeklagten Personen sind Immigranten, obwohl Immigranten nur 16 Prozent der Bevölkerung ausmachen.[vii]

Immigranten aus verschiedenen Ländern begehen in Dänemark Verbrechen mit wesentlich höherer Häufigkeit als ethnische Dänen. Das gilt besonders für Immigranten aus Afrika und dem Mittleren Osten.[viii] Die höchste Häufigkeit des Gesetzesbruchs zeigten Kinder von Immigranten aus nicht-westlichen Ländern. Personen der Altersgruppe 15-19 waren um 93 Prozent überrepräsentiert, Personen der Altersgruppe 20-29 um 130 Prozent und Personen zwischen 30 und 39 Jahren waren um 135 Prozent überrepräsentiert. Ethnische Dänen waren in allen diesen Alterskategorien unterrepräsentiert.

Für Deutschland sind Fakten zu Kriminalität weniger zugänglich, aber unbestätigte Berichte legen nahe, dass 2011 Asylbewerber 3,3 Prozent aller Verbrechen begingen, wesentlich mehr als ihr Anteil an der Bevölkerung.[ix] 2014 war diese bereits hohe Zahl auf 7,7 Prozent aller Verbrechen angewachsen. Im gleichen Zeitraum hat sich die Zahl der Angriffe und Ladendiebstähle in Deutschland mehr als verdoppelt.[x]

Verringerte Sozialleistungen

Offensichtlich wird der Zustrom von Millionen armer Menschen das Sozialbudget belasten. Europäer, die ihr ganzes Leben Sozialversicherungsbeiträge bezahlt haben, werden bald die Gesundheitsversorgung, die Unterbringung, die Arbeitslosenunterstützung und die Altersunterstützung für Millionen Personen bezahlen die nie zu diesen Versicherungen beigetragen haben. Wird der Zustrom nicht gestoppt wird dies einen astronomischen Reichtumstransfer auslösen, solange das Sozialsystem überlebt.

Es wird möglicherweise nicht lange überleben, da die europäischen Regierungen bereits hoch verschuldet sind und hohe Sozialausgaben verwalten. 2013, das letzte Jahr für das Daten zur Verfügung stehen, betrug der Anteil der Bruttostaatsschulden am Bruttoinlandsprodukt in Österreich 81%, in Belgien 104%, in Frankreich 92%, in Deutschland 77%, in Italien 128%, in Spanien 92% und im Vereinigten Königreich  87%.[xi]

In Schweden beträgt die Staatsverschuldung nur um 39% des Bruttoinlandsprodukts, aber die dortigen Immigranten aus Afrika und dem Mittleren Osten belasten das Budget. Diese Immigranten machen ca. 16% des Bevölkerung aus, beanspruchen aber 58% der Sozialausgaben. Dies ist ein großer Reichtumstransfer zu Ungunsten ethnischer Schweden.[xii] Dieser Transfer ist eine schlechte Investition da ca. 48% der Immigranten in arbeitsfähigen Alter arbeitslos sind. Sogar nach 15 Jahren im Land sind noch immer 40% arbeitslos.

Doch Sozialleistungen sind noch fragiler als diese Zahlen nahelegen.

Forschungen der deutschen Max Planck Gesellschaft legen nahe, dass ethnischer Wandel durch Immigration die Motivation der Steuerzahler wandeln wird, indem ihre Bereitschaft Sozialleistungen zu unterstützen nachlässt. Vergleiche der Sozialsysteme weltweit zeigt, dass mit der Zunahme ethnischer Vielfalt Sozialleistungen dazu neigen, zu sinken.[xiii]

Nicht nur Sozialleistungen nehmen ab, sondern alle Dienstleistungen die auf Abgaben für öffentliche Güter basieren. Dies beinhaltet die Kooperation mit der Polizei, Wohlfahrtsorganisationen, medizinische und militärische Autoritäten.

Entwicklungshilfe, die nichts anderes als internationale Sozialleistungen sind, ist sogar noch fragiler. Entwicklungshilfe steht stark in einer negativen Beziehung mit der ethnischen Vielfalt der Geberländer.[xiv]

Die Ironie könnte nicht grausamer sein. Indem europäische Länder eine große Zahl von Personen aus nicht-westlichen Kulturen aufnehmen, die danach streben von großzügigen Sozialleistungen zu profitieren, riskieren sie nicht nur den Verlust inländischer Sozialleistungen für Einheimische und Immigranten gleichermaßen sondern verringern auch die Entwicklungshilfe für die Heimatländer der Immigranten. Es ist eine „Lose-Lose“ Strategie.

Größere ethnische Ungleichheit

Ethnische Ungleichheit, eine wesentliche Ursache gesellschaftlicher Konflikte, wird als Ergebnis des gegenwärtigen Zustroms zunehmen. Wenn eine ethnische Gruppe es nicht schafft nach einigen Generationen Einkommensgleichheit zu erreichen, sind tief verinnerlichte Feindseligkeit und eine niedrige Schwelle für zivilen Ungehorsam die Folge. Dies könnte die Ursache für die höhere Kriminalität der Kinder von Immigranten verglichen mit ihren Eltern sein.

Einmal mehr gibt es keine Entschuldigung für Unwissenheit, da Deutschland einen einheimischen Lehrer für die Ursachen ethnischer Ungleichheit hat. Thilo Sarrazin war SPD-Politiker und bis 2010  Mitglied des Vorstandes der deutschen Bundesbank, das Jahr in dem er ein Buch mit dem Titel Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen veröffentlichte.[xv] Sarrazin dokumentierte die langsame Geschwindigkeit der Integration türkischer Immigranten in die deutsche Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft, ihre unverhältnismäßige Abhängigkeit von Sozialleistungen der Regierung und ihre höhere Fruchtbarkeit. Er fand heraus, dass diese langsame Assimilation von der islamischen Religion verursacht wurde und dass schlechtere Bildungserfolge auf hartnäckige ethnische Traditionen zurückzuführen waren.[xvi] Als er dies schrieb war Angela Merkel bereits deutsche Kanzlerin. Sie verurteilte Sarrazin und befürwortete seine Entlassung aus dem Vorstand der deutschen Bundesbank, ein Omen für ihre Intoleranz und Radikalität 2015.

Es ist sicher, dass der gegenwärtige Zustrom die ethnische Schichtung in Deutschland und Europa sprunghaft ansteigen lassen wird. Wenn dies nur auf schlechte Sprachkenntnisse und unzureichende Bildung zurückzuführen wäre, könnte die Ungleichheit innerhalb einer oder zwei Generationen überwunden werden (auch dies wäre ein schrecklicher Angriff auf die Empfängerländer). Aber viele der Immigranten stammen aus Bevölkerungen mit einer langen Geschichte schlechter Bildungs- und Wirtschaftsleistungen. Dies ist vermutlich die Folge chronischer ethnischer Schichtung die an despotische Reiche erinnert.[xvii] Indem Deutschland und Europa eine neue Unterschicht importieren, schaffen sie ihre egalitären nationalen Gesellschaften ab.

Rassisch verformte Politik

Eine Politik der offenen Tür wird von selbst ernannten Antirassisten wie Angela Merkel und ihren Verbündeten in der extremen Linken vertreten. Die Protestierenden der Antifa, die PEGIDA und andere Konservative niederschreien, halten es für selbstverständlich, dass Grenzen für alle die kommen offen sein sollten. Aber ein sicheres Ergebnis des neuen Zustroms von Immigranten ist die weitere rassische Verformung der Politik und zunehmender demographischer Druck auf ethnische Europäer. Rassische Verformung wird die Form von Sektiererei, ethnischen Parteien, Multikulturalismus, Indoktrination in den Schulen, politische Korrektheit und Förderungsmaßnahmen für Minderheiten – Diskriminierung die Ergebnisse angleichen soll annehmen. Rassisch verformte Politik ist bereits eine Tatsache des Lebens in vielfältigen Gesellschaften wie Großbritannien, Frankreich, die Vereinigten Staaten und Australien.

Während der gesamten bekannten Geschichte haben Gesellschaften Immigration kontrolliert, besonders wenn es um große Zahlen ging. Die Politik der offenen Tür von Angela Merkel und Francois Hollande ist ein unverantwortliches gesellschaftliches Experiment, dass bereits eine Ermüdung des Mitleids [Compassion Fatigue, auch als secondary traumatic stress bekannt] auslöst. Nationalistische und gegen Immigration gerichtete Parteien befinden sich in Österreich, Belgien, Großbritannien, Dänemark, Frankreich, Griechenland,  Ungarn, Italien, Polen, der Slowakei, Schweden und in der Schweiz im Aufstieg.

Die weiter oben diskutierte ethnische Ungleichheit ist eine wichtige Ursache rassischer Verformung [von Politik]. Arme Immigrantengruppen, speziell solche die kulturell oder rassisch sichtbar sind, werden  in der zweiten Generation empfänglich für Radikalisierung durch Ideologien die ihre Beschwerden legitimieren. Diese Ideologien helfen Immigranten ihren niedrigen sozioökonomischen Status und ihr Gefühl der Entfremdung zu rationalisieren, indem sie diese zu Opfern von weißen Rassismus erklären. Diese Ideologien werden aus Universitäten, aus Schulen, aus den Medien, von Sozialarbeitern, von Politikern und ethnischen Führern übernommen.

Opferideologien erzeugen zudem Angst und Schuldgefühle in Weißen, indem sie ihre ethnische Identitäten – und nur ihre ethnischen Identitäten – mit Extremismus und Faschismus verbinden.[xviii] Dies ist unfair, da weiße Mehrheiten meist weniger ethnozentrisch sind als Minderheiten.

Der Mythos der Opferrolle von Minderheiten konditioniert die weiße Mehrheit Immigration in einem Umfang das zum Bevölkerungsaustausch ausreicht zu akzeptieren. Diese Doktrinen waren in englisch-sprachigen Ländern und weiten Teilen Westeuropas seit der Kulturrevolution der 1960er und 1970er einflussreich.

Währenddessen hat Einwanderungspolitik in Deutschland den undemokratischen Politikmodus ausgelöst, der in westlichen Ländern für ethnische Politik typisch ist. Es ist kein Referendum geplant um Deutschen eine Wahl bezüglich ihrem Schicksal zu geben. Mit wenigen Ausnahmen haben Bürger noch nicht einmal die Möglichkeit gegen die Politik der offenen Tür abzustimmen, da  die großen Parteien  offene Grenzen unterstützen. Deutsche, die ein Mitspracherecht in der Einwanderungsdebatte haben wollen, müssen für neue Parteien stimmen, die noch nicht von Interessengruppen [special interests] übernommen worden sind.

Eingeschränkte Bürgerrechte

Zunehmende Vielfalt unterhöhlt Bürgerrechte. Wo immer die ursprünglich staatsbildende ethnische Gruppe die Kontrolle über Immigration  verloren hat, geraten Regierungen unter den Druck der politischen Linken und ihrer Wähler in den Minderheiten sog. Hatespeech [politisch inkorrekte freie Meinungsäußerung] zu unterdrücken, wobei Hatespeech auch Meinungen und Fakten beinhalten kann. Die Einschränkung der freien Meinungsäußerung geht der Zunahme der Immigration im Verdrängungsmaßstab [replacement level immigration] voraus und hilft diese auszulösen. Sie ist aber sicher auch eine Folge von Vielfalt.

Einschränkungen der Meinungsäußerung haben eine abschreckende Wirkung auf die öffentliche Debatte. Die Millionen, die jetzt nach Deutschland und Europa fluten, sind Begünstigte dieser Unterdrückung. Ihre Anwesenheit wird den Druck auf Regierungen hart gegen beunruhigte Einheimische vorzugehen nur noch vergrößern. Die dem harten Durchgreifen zugrunde liegende Ursache, wird die Zunahme massiven endemischen gesellschaftlichen Konflikts sein. Ein gesellschaftlicher Konflikt der komplett vorhersagbar ist und tatsächlich von Sozialwissenschaftlern vorhergesagt wurde.

Nutzen? Argumente für offene Grenzen

Werden diese Kosten vom Nutzen, den Angela Merkel und ihre Unterstützer anführen, überwogen? Sechs Argumente wurden angeführt um Deutsche zu überzeugen den Zustrom hinzunehmen.

1. Das erste Argument ist Merkels Behauptung, dass Deutschland und Europa moralisch verpflichtet sind echte Flüchtlinge anzusiedeln. Es gibt offensichtlich eine moralische Pflicht zu helfen, aber das Argument, dass Flüchtlinge in Europa angesiedelt werden müssen scheitert aus zwei einfachen Gründen. Erstens sind viele der Ankommenden keine Flüchtlinge sondern wirtschaftliche Immigranten. Zweitens folgt aus den hohen Kosten die der Zustrom für einheimische Deutsche verursacht, dass eine moralische Politik die Interessen beider Seiten optimieren muss und nicht das Wohlergehen der Immigranten auf Kosten der gastgebenden Gesellschaft maximiert. Schließlich ist die erste Pflicht von Regierungen in Demokratien ihre Wähler zu beschützen. Deutschland und die EU könnten Flüchtlingen in oder nahe ihren eigenen Ländern helfen.

2. Das zweite Argument ist Merkels Behauptung, dass Deutschland profitieren wird, indem es ein und für alle mal das Erbe des Nazismus abwirft. Dies ist ein abscheuliches Argument, da Deutsche unschuldig am Völkermord sind, es sei denn man akzeptiert die nationalsozialistische Doktrin rassischer Kollektivschuld. Die entgegengesetzte Wirkung ist wahrscheinlicher. Die Verunglimpfung ethnischer Deutscher könnte zunehmen, da Merkel eine neue Ära rassisch verformter Politik ausgelöst hat, in der Befürworter von massenhafter Immigration aus der Dritten Welt den Opferrollen Narrativ nutzen wird um die Mehrheit zum Schweigen zu bringen.

3. Das dritte Argument wurde vom deutschen Innenminister Mitte September 2015 ausgesprochen.[xix] Er behauptete, dass die Regierung keine Wahl hätte außer jede Anzahl an Flüchtlingen anzunehmen, da Artikel 16a, Paragraph 1 des deutschen Grundgesetzes aussagt, dass „Personen die aus politischen Gründen verfolgt werden Asyl erhalten sollen.“ Dies ist ein strikt legalistisches Argument, da, wie wir gesehen haben, es keine moralische Pflicht gibt eine große Zahl an Flüchtlingen in Deutschland anzusiedeln. Lassen sie uns einen genaueren Blick auf das Gesetz werfen. Paragraph 2 des Artikels 16a des Grundgesetzes präzisiert, das Paragraph 1 nicht auf Personen zutrifft, welche die Bundesrepublik „aus einem Mitgliedsstaat der Europäischen Gemeinschaft“ betreten. [xx] Die überwiegende Mehrheit der Flüchtlinge die Deutschland betreten sind durch andere EU Staaten gekommen. Deutschland hatte das Recht sie an der Einreise zu hindern, aber die Regierung Merkel setzte die Dublin Regelung aus, die verlangt, das Asylbewerber in das europäische Land ihrer Erstankunft zurückgeführt werden.[xxi] Wie konnte Deutschland das EU-Gesetz ursprünglich annehmen wenn es seinem Grundgesetz widersprach? Wie konnte die Dublin Regelung so einfach ausgesetzt werden, wenn sie andererseits dem Artikel 16a des Grundgesetzes entspricht?[xxii] Offensichtlich können Deutschland und die EU legal ihre Grenzen beschützen. Es sind Merkel und andere führende Politiker der EU die den Zustrom erlaubt haben, nicht irgendein Gesetz.

4. Das vierte Argument wurde von Merkel und dem Vorstandsvorsitzenden von Mercedes Dieter Zetsche vorgebracht, der behauptete, dass Flüchtlinge zu produktiven Arbeitern werden würden. Zetsche sagte: „Sie könnten wie die Gastarbeiter vor einigen Jahrzehnten uns helfen unseren Wohlstand zu erhalten und zu mehren. Deutschland kann schließlich nicht mehr alle verfügbaren Arbeitsstellen besetzen.“ Dies ist eine utopische Spekulation, die der bisherigen Erfahrung und unserem Wissen über kulturelle Unterschiede widerspricht. Es ist wahrscheinlicher, dass Deutschland mit Gemeinschaften von Immigranten belastet wird die an hoher Arbeitslosigkeit leiden und in unqualifizierten Berufen mit niedriger Produktivität konzentriert sind.

5. Das fünfte Argument ist sogar noch radikaler. Es wurde vom Demographen Stephan Sievert vom Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung vorgebracht. Sievert äußerte sich optimistisch, dass Deutschlands Bevölkerung zumindest nach Jahrzehnten der Stagnation wieder wuchs.[xxiii] Sievert gibt nicht zu, dass die von ihm angedeutete Politik die rasante demographische Verdrängung der deutschen ethnischen Familie mit sich bringt, effektiv ein schrittweiser kultureller Völkermord. Hätte das deutsche Volk die Möglichkeit über diese Politik abzustimmen würde eventuell eine Mehrheit dem deutschen Autor Botho Strauss zustimmen, der ausführte, dass er es vorzieht unter seinem eigenen Volk zu leben, selbst wenn es schrumpft, als unter einem erzwungenen kulturellen Mix zu leben.[xxiv]

6. Ein sechstes Argument wurde von Merkel in ihrer Neujahrsansprache für 2016 angeführt. Es handelt sich um das offene Grenzen Mantra, dass Immigration generell gut ist. Merkel sagte, dass: „Länder immer von erfolgreicher Immigration profitiert hätten, sowohl wirtschaftlich als auch gesellschaftlich.“[xxv] Es ist ein Zeichen für Gefahr wenn hoch gebildete Personen auf Tautologien zurückgreifen, wie eben, dass erfolgreiche Immigration erfolgreich ist. Tatsächlich sind Einwanderungsgesellschaften – Amerika, Australien, Kanada, die Niederlande, Frankreich und andere – weit in dem Prozess fortgeschritten ihre Gründungskulturen zu Minderheiten zu machen, ohne ihnen eine demokratische Wahl zu lassen. Merkel folgte zudem der üblichen Pro-Immigrationsargumentation, indem sie ihre Kritiker der „Kälte oder sogar des Hasses“ bezichtigte, womit sie nahe legte von wärmeren Emotionen motiviert zu sein. Zudem deutete sie eine neue umfassende Definition dessen an, was es bedeutet Deutsch zu sein, ein kluger Schachzug für eine Person die zu einer demographischen Transformation entschlossen ist. Bei diesen letzten Äußerungen wurden andere Elemente des Pro-Immigrationsmantras ausgelassen die aber sicherlich bald folgen werden, wie das Vielfalt Stärke ist, oder das deutsche Identität das gleiche wie die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft ist, oder das Schulkinder zu Toleranz erzogen werden müssen, oder das Immigranten die deutsche Kultur vor einseitiger kultureller Verarmung bewahren. Diese Argumente und Behauptungen sind vollkommen normal in westlichen Gesellschaften, deren politische Klassen sie der Massenimmigration geöffnet haben.

Diese sechs angeblichen Vorteile massiver, ungefilterter Immigration sind typisch für das intellektuelle Level von Argumenten für offene Grenzen in anderen westlichen Ländern. Das derartige oberflächliche und manchmal verlogene Rhetorik von intelligenten Individuen geäußert wird, wäre ohne ihr Beinahe-Monopol über den Medienzugang, infolge ideologischer Intoleranz, die offene Debatten seit Jahrzehnten unterdrückt, unmöglich.

Ergebnis: Wagnis. Wird Europa überleben?

Das bis hierher überprüfte Beweismaterial legt nahe, dass ernste Warnungen nicht übertrieben sind. Die ethnische Transformation die jetzt Deutschland und dem Rest Europas von ihren politischen Klassen aufgezwungen wird, wird, falls man sie fortsetzt, die europäische Kultur und die europäische Lebensweise stark schädigen. Gegenargumente hierzu sind fadenscheinig und scheitern komplett daran sich mit den Risiken auseinanderzusetzen. Kommentatoren übertreiben nicht, wenn sie warnen, dass die Europäische Zivilisation, das Ergebnis von drei Jahrtausenden kultureller Evolution, in Gefahr ist.

Hoffentlich setzt sich der gesunde Menschenverstand durch so das Journalisten und Politiker respektvoll den Sorgen und Erwartungen der Bevölkerung zuhören. Vielleicht erholen sich Merkel und Hollande von ihrer moralischen Manie und befreien sich von Interessengruppen [special interests] lange genug um die Flut zurückgehen zu lassen. Vielleicht wird die EU eine konservative Immigrationspolitik formulieren, die nicht vor allem den Interessen von Immigranten, Minderheiten und der Wirtschaft dient, sondern auch die Europäer respektiert, indem sie ihre Identitäten, ihre Kulturen, ihren inneren [domestic] Frieden, Gleichheit und nationalen Zusammenhalt bewahrt. Es ist wahrscheinlicher, dass statt der intellektuell korrupten politischen Klasse die Wähler das Problem lösen werden und dass neue Parteien die Macht erhalten werden die nationale Souveränität vom gescheiterten EU Projekt zurückzuerobern. In diesem Fall wird die EU zusammenbrechen, sobald einzelne Nationen Schritte ergreifen sich vor dem Schengen-Abkommen zu schützen, das jetzt mehr eine tödliche Bedrohung anstatt einer Verheißung ist. Dies könnte die Grundlage einer neuen Trans-Europäischen Bewegung sein, welche die Identitäten und Lebensweisen individueller Nationen und Europas als Ganzem beschützt.

Doch bisher waren diese Erwägungen Angela Merkel und ihren Unterstützern fremd. Sie verkauft ihre Politik der offenen Tür als humanitäre Maßnahme. Doch in Wahrheit ist dies eine grausame Politik die höchstwahrscheinlich Leiden in Deutschland und Europa herbeiführen wird. Sie hat darin versagt die Interessen einzelner europäischer Nationen oder Europas als Ganzem in Betracht zu ziehen. Die europäische politische Klasse hat effektiv die aggressivste Form des Multikulturalismus gewählt, in welcher die Elite eine Allianz mit Minderheiten eingeht um die Mehrheit zu beherrschen.

Die Leiden, welche die Politik der offenen Tür herbeiführen wird – die Ungleichheit, inklusive des besonderen Übels der ethnischen Schichtung, der Zusammenbruch des Sozialstaates, die Kriminalität, die Elendsviertel und No-Go-Areas, die Erniedrigung der Frauen, die rassische Verformung der Politik, das Sinken der Löhne, der Verlust an nationalem Zusammenhalt, das zunehmende Gefühl des Verlustes und der Entfremdung unter Deutschen und Immigranten gleicher maßen, die beschleunigte Verdrängung von Europäern in ihren alten Heimatländern, die Beschränkung der Bürgerrechte und das allgegenwärtige Chaos – all dies wird Generationen währen.

Merkel ist in doppeltem Sinne grausam, da sie Entwicklungsländer ihrer gebildeteren und unternehmerisch begabteren Bürger beraubt. Der unausweichliche Rückgang europäischer Entwicklungshilfe, ausgelöst durch die Stagnation europäischer Wirtschaften und einem Verlust an sozialem Kapital, wird armen Ländern weltweit schaden.

Eine verantwortungsvolle Politik würde der britischen Strategie ähneln, Flüchtlingen in oder nahe bei ihren eigenen Ländern zu helfen, während gleichzeitig die Immigration nach Europa beschränkt wird. Es sollte allerdings festgehalten werden, dass in Großbritannien die Immigration durch andere Personengruppen als Flüchtlingen außer Kontrolle ist.

Die Situation in Deutschland ist trotz des gegenwärtig niedrigen Maßes an Vielfalt bedrohlicher aufgrund Deutschlands giftiger politischer Kultur. Deutschlands Chancen auf Erholung – was bedeutet eine tragfähige Immigrationspolitik durchzusetzen – richten sich danach, wie die folgenden Fragen durch die kommenden Ereignisse beantwortet werden.

Wie lange wird es dauern, bis aus der gegenwärtigen Reaktion auf die Ereignisse eine mächtige politische Kraft wird? Wie lange wird es dauern, bis Deutschlands Führung den Zorn des Volkes spürt, der durch die Aussicht auf die Transformation des Landes provoziert wird? Sollte die Reaktion auf die Ereignisse sich intensivieren, stellt sich die Frage, ob die Bürger lange genug mobilisiert bleiben um politische Organisationen aufzubauen die mächtig genug sind um die Situation zu bereinigen? Werden sie in der Lage sein einen politischen Druck auf Merkel und die politische Klasse aufzubauen, der ausreicht um die von der Elite gebotenen Anreize zu neutralisieren? Werden sie hierzu trotz unaufhörlicher Angriffe durch die Massenmedien und die Eliten des Bildungssektors fähig sein? Werden sie lange genug fokussiert bleiben die Regelungen der EU neu zu verhandeln oder Deutschland aus diesen zu entfernen? Werden sie lange genug beharren um Verfassungsänderungen durchzusetzen, die Deutschland als das Heimatland des deutschen Volkes definieren und rechtliche Abhilfe gegen politische Führer ermöglicht, die demographische Verdrängung herbeizuführen versuchen?

Unabhängig von einer Unterbrechung des Zustroms sollten Deutsche und Europäer sich über die tiefen Ursachen dieses Desasters und über Wege zur Vermeidung einer Wiederholung informieren.



[i] Phillip Hudson, “Europe must follow our lead on turnbacks: Abbott”, The Australian, 28 Oct. 2015, p. 2.

[ii] Rummel, R. J. (1997). “Is collective violence correlated with social pluralism?” Journal of Peace Research 34(3): 163-176.

[iii] Vanhanen, T. (2012). Ethnic conflicts: Their biological roots in ethnic nepotism. London, Ulster Institute for Social Research.

[iv] Dinesen, P. T. and K. M. Soenerskov (2015). “Ethnic diversity and social trust: Evidence from the micro-context.” American Sociological Review. DOI: 10.1177/0003122415577989.

[v] Salter, F. K. and H. Harpending (2013). “J. P. Rushton’s theory of ethnic nepotism.” Personality and Individual Differences 55: 256-260.

[vi] Arbatli, C. E., Q. Ashraf and O. Galor (2015). The nature of conflict. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 21079. Abstract:, text:

[vii] Interview of Tino Sanandaji by Margaret Wente, “Sweden’s ugly immigration problem”, The Globe and Mail [Canada], 11 Sept. 2015.

And see Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (2005). “Crime among people born in Sweden and abroad” (Swedish).

[viii] Danish Statistical Yearbook, 2015:

[ix] In 2014 Germany received 44,000 applications for asylum. It accepted 6,995 applications for asylum and rejected 37,340.,_2014_(number,_rounded_figures)_YB15_IV.png

[x] Assaults rose from 3,863 to 9,655, shoplifting from 4,974 to 13,894. Nick Cater, “Nightmare behind the diversity dream revealed”, The Australian, 13 Oct. 2015, p. 12.

[xi] UK Office for National Statistics. “How much gross debt did the EU28 countries have in 2013?”

[xii] Interview of Sanandaji, op cit.

[xiii] Sanderson, S. K. and T. Vanhanen (2004). Reconciling the differences between Sanderson’s and Vanhanen’s results. Welfare, ethnicity, and altruism. New data and evolutionary theory. F. K. Salter (ed.). London, Frank Cass: 119-120.

[xiv] Salter, F. K. (2004). Ethnic diversity, foreign aid, economic growth, social stability, and population policy: A perspective on W. Masters and M. McMillan’s findings. Op cit.

[xv] Sarrazin, Thilo (2010). Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen [Germany abolishes itself: How we risk losing our country]. Berlin, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.

[xvi] Herrnstein, R. and C. Murray (1994). The bell curve. Intelligence and class structure in American life. New York, Free Press.

Gottfredson, L. S. (1997). “Why g matters: The complexity of everyday life.” Intelligence 24(1): 79-132.

[xvii] Lynn, R. (2005). Race differences in intelligence: An evolutionary analysis. Augusta, GA, Washington Summit Publishers.

[xviii] Duchesne, R. (2015). “The Greek-Roman invention of civic identity versus the current demotion of European identity.” The Occidental Quarterly 15(3): 37-71.

[xix] The Interior Minister was Dr. Thomas de Maizière. “Die Fluechtlinge”, Radio BR2, “Tagesgesprech”, 14 Sept. 2015.

[xx] Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.

[xxi]„Die Regierung Merkel setzte am 24.08.2015 die Dublin Regel aus, so dass es möglich wurde die Asylanträge syrischer Flüchtlinge in Deutschland zu bearbeiten bzw. die Flüchtlinge in Deutschland aufzunehmen.“

[xxii] In early October 2015, Merkel sidelined de Maizière from the leadership of a new ministry charged with managing the immigrant crisis. He had been critical of immigrant behaviour and the way the intake was being managed, so Merkel appointed someone closer to her who could be trusted to share her enthusiasm for keeping Germany’s door unconditionally open.

[xxiii] Bojan Pancevski, “Ghosts of Gastarbeiter prime Germany for influx”, The Sunday Times, reprinted in The Australian, 14 Sept. 2015, p. 7.

[xxiv] Botho Strauss: “Ich möchte lieber in einem aussterbenden Volk leben als in einem, das aus vorwiegend ökonomisch-demografischen Spekulationen mit fremden Völkern aufgemischt, verjüngt wird, einem vitalen.“ Zitiert in Pancevski, “Merkel fights to keep door open as German fear of migrants grows”, op cit.

[xxv] “Merkel defends migrant stand”, The Weekend Australian, 2-3 January 2016, p. 10.


The late Peter Walsh on Australia’s hostile elite

Nick Cater has recorded some views of Peter Walsh, Australian Finance Minister in the 1980s, who died in April 2015 aged 80. Walsh served in the Hawke and Keating cabinets but was suspicious of their embrace of multiculturalism (“Prescient warnings of a minister of common sense”, The Australian, 14 April 2015).

In his memoirs, Confessions of a Failed Finance Minister (1995), Walsh defended Australia’s Anglo-Celtic culture against those attacking it. The intensity of those attacks are indicated by Walsh’s guess at the motives of the critics: “What psychotic disorder, what deep-seated se1f-loathing, causes people who are the beneficiaries of that heritage to constantly vilify and denigrate it?” (Cater did not provide the source for this quote.)

Cater points out that Walsh was not tertiary educated, leaving school at age 10. Walsh believed that his Labor Party had been captured by a tertiary-educated elite, an “authoritarian group which regards itself as Left progressive” and served the “bourgeois Left and middle-class trendoids in the gentrified suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne”. In particular he was critical of the “amoral” political tactics of his colleague Graham Richardson, who he thought sought to hold power for its own sake, not advance particular policies.

Walsh also criticised Paul Keating, prime minister from 1991 to 1996, for pandering to vocal minorities which had good media connections, including Aboriginal and other ethnic activists. Keating thought that he could retain power by pleasing minorities. He judged Keating to be gullible when he accepted ethnic activists as leaders of their communities. And he objected to the Keating government’s stiffening of the Racial Discrimination Act with section 18c which outlawed causing offence to ethnic or racial groups.

Walsh’s views on immigration are not quoted. But if he resented vilification and denigration of Australia’s core identity, he certainly would have rejected any attempt to subject Anglo Australia to cultural genocide using replacement-level immigration, as described by senior journalist Greg Sheridan.

Hostile Western Elites: Captured?

Emeritus Professor of Law David Flint AM argues that the terrorist Man Haron Monis would not have been at liberty to commit murder in a Sydney cafe in December 2014 if the New South Wales legislative process had not been captured by political factions and left ideologues.[i] His contention that political and administrative elites have in a sense been captured by untoward forces or processes has merit and is an important observation, though his characterisation of those forces leaves room for further work.

Before describing Flint’s argument, it should be noted that he is a credible witness for reporting elite legislative processes. His career began when he was admitted as a lawyer in NSW and England. His lectures at universities generally combined legal and business matters. In 1977 he served a year as head of the Faculty of Business at the University of Technology, Sydney. From 1987 until 1997 he served as the University’s Dean of Law. He was appointed to various other high level functions, not surprising in light of his being named World Outstanding Legal Scholar by the World Jurists Association in 1991. He is widely published on legal, legislative and business subjects, including elites (The Twilight of the Elites, 2003).

The essentials of Flint’s argument begin with the reasonable assertion that once upon a time someone like Monis would not have been allowed into Australia, would not have been granted citizenship, and not have been allowed to live drone-like from the taxes of the Australian people. When this era of prudence ended is not stated but Flint implies that it was some decades ago because only hundreds of thousands or perhaps millions of Australians remember it. And it could not have been recent decades because it was a time when “the nation’s political class was little different from the rank and file. We all shared the same Australian qualities of common sense, good judgment and basic decency.”

How could someone so criminal, so fanatical and so parasitic not only be granted citizenship but be released on bail while charged with serious offenses? “The answer lies in the capture of the nation’s and the state of NSW’s legislative process, administration and bench, and their consequent failure to fulfil the reasonable expectations of rank-and-file Australians.” (Emphasis added.)

Flint proposes two agencies that have effectively captured the political and administrative elites.

The first agency is the rise of political factions, that have robbed members of parliament of their freedom of judgment. They are compelled to vote as their factional bosses direct in order to secure a comfortable retirement. A problem here is that factionalism has been part and parcel of Australian politics for at least a century. Parties themselves are a type of faction that restrict the independence of members, and parties go back centuries. The faction concept might be more useful if broadened to include lobbies of one sort or another – business or religious for example – that capture elites using inducements, threats or persuasion.

The second reason Flint advances is more plausible, that ultra civil libertarian thinkers hold sway over changes to the legal process. This resulted in “radically utopian” changes to the bail act that resulted in the public being exposed to Monis.

David Flint has been critical of out-of-touch elites for some time, at least since he wrote The Twilight of the Elites in the first years of this century. This important topic points us towards the ideological, sociological and demographic dimensions of the corruption of elite leadership in Australia, going far enough back to account for Monis’s immigration in 1996.

To explain the political elites’ alienation from everyday Australians it is necessary to consider such sociological concepts as hegemony, in which power is exerted by indoctrinating people in empirical and moral doctrines. Related trends include the leftist dominance of the university system from the 1960s, resulting in the indoctrination of elites-in-training and the rise of utopian anti-Western ideological movements in the professional class, especially in academe, the media and entertainment. Elite alienation might also result from extreme levels of economic inequality now being seen in English-speaking societies, itself exacerbated by rising ethnic diversity, a solvent of social cohesion and trust.

In previous articles and posts I described hostile attitudes towards the Australian people on the part of political and media elites. Would Flint describe these people as captives or captors? What distinguishes the two categories? To make that distinction will require identifying the source of actors’ motivations, whether they are endogenous in characteristics such as personality and identity or are reactions to external manipulation.

The research literature on cultural warfare examines these questions indirectly. For example Eric Kaufmann’s monograph, The Rise and Fall of Anglo America (2004), examines how post-ethnic radical ideology (“cosmopolitanism”) originated and rose to capture elite universities in the U.S. by the 1950s or 1960s, initiating the top-down transformation that Flint describes and which is still unfolding in Australia and other Western societies. Kaufmann maintains that the leading motivation of those in the cosmopolitan vanguard was humanistic idealism, and that they won converts through force of analysis and moral passion. Once the movement gained momentum it began capturing institutions through educational indoctrination and intimidating critics, first university departments then whole disciplines and then government bureaucracies in a process foreseen by the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci. The latter stages of the process described by Kaufmann are not so different to Flint’s version of capture.

David Flint has put on the table the idea that (effective) elite hostility can be explained by their being captured in some way, either by political processes or ideologies. It remains to more fully describe this phenomenon.



[i] David Flint (2014). “Capture of legislative process, bench opened gates to Man Monis’s release”, The Australian, 19 December. (Abridged print version p. 24).


Parliamentary Passion

Unusual emotions were displayed last week in Federal Parliament. Moral emotions. We are used to anger, sneering, joviality, and copious amounts of straight-faced dull neutrality but not since ex-prime minister Julia Gillard’s speech in October 2012 when she accused Tony Abbott of misogyny have we seen such a display of righteous indignation.

The immediate cause was an Opposition censure motion directed at the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Bronwyn Bishop. Leader of Opposition Business, Tony Burke, accused Bishop of being incompetent, showing partiality, and acting as an “instrument of the Liberal Party”. The demeanour of both sides of the House and of Madam Speaker can be viewed during many interactions on

It was the alleged partiality towards the Government that aroused indignation. Why? Two hypotheses come to mind. Both were suggested in Parliament.

The first hypothesis is that the Speakerdid show partiality. The Opposition cited evidence for this, often as running commentary on the Speaker’s behaviour. For example, at one point Opposition frontbencher Tony Burke protested to the Speaker that she had expelled an Opposition member unfairly. Paraphrasing: “You asked her whether she wanted to leave the House, and when she replied you expelled her!” Other evidence cited is that Bishop had expelled 99 Opposition MPs but no Government MP, a greater than usual ratio. Also, she continues to attend Government party room meetings, breaking a tradition of speakers standing down from such party duties.

The second hypothesis is gamesmanship by the Opposition. The Leader of the Government Business, Christopher Pyne, implied that the Opposition was not genuine in its criticism of the Speaker. He stated that this was a “stunt”, a form of gamesmanship. Evidence for this interpretation is that Tony Burke likened Bronwyn Bishop to a villainous English headmistress on her first day as Speaker.

The Opposition might have felt emboldened to attack the Speaker because of their intuition that she lacked authority with their constituents. They might have felt that the mud would stick – not because she was being grossly unfair but because her peremptory manner was readily interpretable as such, especially for some Labor loyalists.

Characteristics of Bronwyn Bishop fit this interpretation. Bronwyn Bishop is an upper class Anglo lady. Given that the Labor Party is experienced at playing identity politics it is not unreasonable to suppose that they judge her class, ethnicity and sex to be red rags to some Labor voters. From this perspective, baiting the Speaker might be seen as a tactic that will pay dividends, much like Julia Gillard’s attack on Tony Abbott’s “misogyny” was meant to elicit sympathy from women.

Without a formal comparative study this observer cannot test these hypotheses.

But both hypotheses reflect on the wisdom of the Westminster tradition. Whether the Speaker was guilty as charged or the Opposition unfairly accused her of partiality in order to undermine her authority, impartiality is prescribed in that tradition and for very good reasons.[1]

Parliaments dispense great wealth and power that affect the lives of millions. It is therefore not surprising that contests for advantage within them can become heated. Members of those parliaments are usually people of talent and energy, capable of holding their own in debate and intellectual contest. Regulating their debates requires not only skill but power. But a parliament is not a dictatorship or a politbureau or a corporate board. In a democracy parliament must be self-governing within the constitutional frame, able to censure a government that has lost support, able to eject an MP who is disruptive, able to call an election that replaces the government.

Parliaments in the Westminster tradition appoint their own speakers whose authority relies on receiving continuing support from the parliament. Speakers are appointed by governments and can continue in power despite unpopularity if the government so wishes. But speakers who rely on coercion often rule over unruly houses. The most productive parliaments are managed by speakers who are respected for their fairness. That depends on them enforcing rules in an impartial manner. That is why in making their criticisms the Opposition displayed moral emotions, instead of the usual mix. They were asserting not that the Speaker lacked power but fairness and the legitimacy and trust that brings.

[1] Salter, F. K. (2008/1995). Emotions in command: Biology, bureaucracy, and cultural evolution. New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers. Chapter 8: “Chairmen’s command of meeting procedure: The challenge of aggression”.