Ethnic kinship

ETHNIC KINSHIP

Quantification and Increase through Political Evolution

Frank Salter

[Original details:]

Max Planck Society, Human Ethology,

Von-der-Tann-Str. 3,

82346 Andechs, Germany

Notes for a report presented at the 16th biennial meeting of the International Society for Human Ethology, 7-10 August 2002, Montreal

Abstract

Biological theories of the origin of heroism in warfare and other types of altruism directed towards the tribe or ethnic group have often attributed this to some adaptive function, such as retention of group resources. However, without an estimate of the aggregate kinship at stake within the group, no theory of altruism can be tested using W. D. Hamilton’s rule for adaptive altruism. By “adaptive”, Hamilton meant evolutionarily stable, such that the altruist’s genes are not selected out of the gene pool. Though Hamilton’s 1975 model showed that ethnic kinship could theoretically be large, no evolutionary theory has yet answered the most basic question, whether in fact ethnic kinship—the genetic similarity of co-ethnics who are not genealogical kin—is ever large enough to make ethnic altruism adaptive.

Harpending (2002) derived a population-genetic formula for estimating the aggregate ethnic kinship held by one population in relation to another based on the genetic distance between the two populations. The genetic assay data needed to make this estimate for modern ethnic groups are becoming available. The data used in this present study are provided by Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994). Based on those data, aggregate ethnic kinship is much larger than aggregate family kinship. Data on tribal genetic distance are uncertain. But existing evidence indicates that tribal genetic interests vis a vis neighbouring tribes in the Neolithic were already larger than familial kinship. The direction of theory and data strongly indicate that self sacrificial altruism in warfare could have been adaptive from that time.

The Hamilton-Harpending algorithm offers an analytical tool for estimating whether a population was (or is) a fit object for altruism, and thus whether that altruism was (or is) sustainable across evolutionary time.

Corrections

Hamilton’s Fst statement referred to genes coding for altruism, not to the whole genome. However, my point regarding kinship remains valid because I used Fst data based on sampling of the genome, not on altruistic genes.

Also please note that the more accurate data provided by the Human Genome Data Base show somewhat lower racial variation and therefore lower racial kinship. Instead of 9%, the French-Japanese variation is 6% (Salter and Harpending 2013). Because the reduction is not great it does not invalidate the analysis.

Salter, F. K., & Harpending, H. (2013). J. P. Rushton’s theory of ethnic nepotism. Personality and Individual Differences http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191886912005569, 55, 256-260. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2012.11.014

I also should correct one part of my summary of David Goetze’s insight concerning collective goods, such as big-game hunting and collective defence. From about the 3 minute mark I say that these cooperative activities allow large investments to be made in large populations. Actually, they also allow small investments to make a difference.

Introduction

The key issue in the evolutionary theory of ethnic conflict is whether solidarity towards fellow ethnics has been adaptive. Components of this problem are:

(1) Was the kinship between random members of bands and tribes large enough for altruism directed towards fellow ethnics to have been adaptive?

(2) If the answer to (1) is yes, then what mechanisms were necessary? Answering this question will help locate the stage in political evolution at which ethnic altruism could have become adaptive, thus allowing genes or culture that code for ethnic altruism to spread through the population.

We already know the answer, or much of the answer, to the second question. Proponents of group selection have argued, convincingly I think, that members of bands and tribes can behave altruistically without being selected out by free riders. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1982) argued from his field observations that mutual monitoring, ubiquitous in small-scale societies, is sufficient to suppress cheating. He pointed to the pronounced group identity and mutual support found in primitive societies, and argued that this originated in kinship bonds. The cohesion of band and tribal societies makes them units of selection, Eibl argued. This point was elaborated by Boyd and Richerson (1992), who argue that monitoring and punishment are so effective in small scale societies that they allow the evolution of cooperation, or any other characteristic that is promoted by a culturally-governed group strategy.

Whether or not one accept that group selection has figured in human evolution, the mechanisms advanced by group selectionists are sufficient to allow a more conservative process, extended kin selection, to occur. In fact this is what Eibl has always meant by his version of group selection.

A final mechanism deserving of mention is collective goods. A criticism of extended kin selection is that it is impossible for an individual effectively to invest in a kin group much larger than a family, because the benefit would be spread so thinly that the payoff would always be greater from investing in close kin, rather than distant ones. Goetze (1998) has dispelled this concern. He draws on economic theory to argue that by contributing to collective goods—such as hunting large game animals or defending the group—allows an individual to confer a large fitness benefit on a large number of individuals.

So there is no mechanical problem with the feasibility of individuals showing altruism to kin groups larger than the extended family. Indeed, all these mechanism—control of free-riders, bonding the group, and choosing or fashioning collective goods—are highly scalable. They can be increased in scale to accommodate a kin group of any size. Admittedly some novel and ingenious social devices are needed to perform these functions for large groups, but humans are ingenious, as is clear from the many experiments in political evolution.

Thus the second problem in understand the evolution of ethnocentrism the second is already solved, or well on its way to being solved. It’s the first problem that remains; indeed, it has hardly been addressed. To reiterate, was the kinship between random members of bands and tribes large enough for altruism directed between them to have been adaptive?

The question should be recast in light of Goetze’s analysis of collective goods. I shall use the term ‘patriotism’ to mean altruism towards a collective good. When collective goods are available to which individuals can contribute, is the aggregate kinship of the whole group sufficiently high to allow patriotism to be adaptive, i.e. evolutionarily stable? Dawkins thinks not. He maintains that only altruism shown to close kin is adaptive. But Hamilton disagreed. In his classic 1975 paper, ‘Innate social aptitudes of man: An approach from evolutionary genetics’, he discarded the notion that inclusive fitness processes can only operate between genealogical kin, and argued that altruism can be adaptive between anonymous, genetically similar individuals.

“[C]onnections which the remote townsman does not so easily know of make up in multiplicity what they lack in close degree” (1975, p. 142).

By townsman Hamilton means the member of a band or tribe. He showed mathematically that even with a steady trickle of migration between populations, relatedness can rise as high as 0.5 between random members. Hamilton concluded that altruism on behalf of the group could then be adaptive, especially if it preserved the group from replacement. The point that inclusive fitness processes can operate between individuals merely on the basis of genetic similarity, without any genealogical information, is critical, and I quote Hamilton’s commentary on this theoretical advance.

“Because of the way it was first explained [by Hamilton], the approach using inclusive fitness has often been identified with “kin selection” and presented strictly as an alternative to “group selection” as a way of establishing altruistic social behaviour by natural selection. But…kinship should be considered just one way of getting positive regression of genotype in the recipient, and that it is this positive regression that is vitally necessary for altruism. Thus the inclusive fitness concept is more general than “kin selection” ” (Hamilton 1975, pp. 140-41; [p. 337 in the 1996 reprint]).

This frees the analyst from the “identical by descent” clause in Hamilton’s original (1964) formulation, allowing the direct measurement of kinship processes using genetic assay data. These data are usually expressed not in terms of kinship coefficients, but genetic variation, for example FST. However, Harpending (1979) provides a formula for converting FST measures to kinship coefficients.

fo = FST + (1 – FST)[ – 1/(2N – 1)]

where fo is the local kinship coefficient, FST the variance of the metapopulation, and N the overall population. Within primordial dialect groups and tribes, where N is approximately 500, the second complex term in this equation is small. When N is large, as it usually is with modern ethnies, a good approximation for the above equation becomes, simply:

foFST

(The kinship concept needs clarification. In population genetics the coefficient of kinship, f, between two individuals is defined as the probability that an allele taken randomly from one will be identical to an allele taken at the same locus from another. This definition is close to that of Hamilton’s (1964) original coefficient of relatedness r, which he used in his classic formulation of inclusive-fitness theory, except that in simple cases 2f = r. This means that parental kinship is 0.25, not 0.5. Kinship to self is 0.5, not the familiar 1.0, which refers to relatedness r. A fuller explanation is provided in Salter [in press])

Harpending’s simple formula allows the estimation of average kinship within local populations based on FST measures. The principle can be simply stated thus: variation between two populations is equal to kinship within each of them. As a hypothetical example, if the variation between two groups P and Q is FST = 0.25, then the kinship between two randomly-chosen members of P is likewise 0.25, or that of sibs or parent and child. The same applies to random pairs drawn from Q.

This brings us to the subject of this presentation: Was there sufficient genetic variation between primordial human groups for individual inclusive fitness to be boosted by acts of ethnic solidarity, by patriotism?

Let’s begin with the band, numbering between 30 and 50 individuals, comprised of two or three extended families connected by marriage ties. I could not locate data on inter-band genetic variation, but Harpending (personal communication) reports that inter-band FST is typically small, 0.01 or less. Let us assume, for illustrative purposes, that it is 0.0005. If, apart from extended family, a band numbered, say, 25 individuals, then this group’s aggregate kinship to a random individual is 0.0005 x 25 = 0.0025, which is the equivalent of one hundredth of a child. This number only has meaning in the context of competition with a neighbouring band. It will be much higher in the context of competition with more genetically distant populations. By comparison to this vanishingly small kinship, an individual’s genealogical kin might represent the genetic equivalent of five or six children (3 actual children plus cousins, grandchildren, etc.). The selection advantage of altruism towards nonkin would usually be outweighed by altruism towards kin. Nevertheless, band solidarity might have paid off because the fate of the extended family was inseparably bound up with the fate of the band. The average kinship with the band would have been high relative to the average kinship with members of neighbouring bands. (An approximation: assume that family plus others yield the equivalent of six children within the band, or an aggregate kinship of 1.5. Then average kinship is 1.5/50 = 0.03. Average kinship with neighbouring bands is –0.01.)

Genetic variation grows with the geographic scale of population units, so that dialect and tribal populations have higher kinship between random pairs than do bands. Typical variation between small dialect groups and tribes might be 0.005. FST between clusters of Bantu tribes is much higher, typically about 0.015. Between West African populations Fst varies from 0.0013 (Ewe-Volta) to 0.049 (Volta-Wolof). The average is about 0.02 (Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994, p. 181). Neighbouring American Indian tribes have a typical genetic distance of about 0.025 (Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994, p. 323). The Americas show high genetic variability, with an average FST of 0.070, compared to Australia’s 0.019, Polynesia’s 0.031, New Guinea’s 0.039, sub-Saharan Africa’s 0.035, and Caucasoid’s as a whole of 0.043 (Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994, p. 336).

Genetic variation continues to increase with geographical , though recall that we are discussing autochthonous populations, those that have been resident in an area for many thousands of years. Cavalli-Sforza et al (1994, p. 122) have charted the relationship between FST and distance within large regions.

 

 

Fig. 1  The relationship between genetic distance and geographic distance within continents. Note that the curves are based on pre-colonial populations (from Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994, p. 122).

 

Between continents genetic variation increases greatly. Table 1 shows the FST distances between geographical races, which can be characterized as continental-scale populations.

AFR NEC EUC NEA ANE AME SEA PAI
Africans 0.0
Non-European Caucasoids 1340 0.0
European Caucasoids 1656 155 0.0
Northeast Asians 1979 640 938 0.0
Arctic Northeast Asians 2009 708 747 460 0.0
Amerindians 2261 956 1038 747 577 0.0
Southeast Asians 2206 940 1240 631 1039 1342 0.0
Pacific Islanders 2505 954 1345 724 1181 1741 437 0.0
New Guineans and Australians 2472 1179 1346 734 1013 1458 1238 809

 

Table 1. Genetic variation between nine geographical races, measured as FST x 10,000 (From Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1994, p. 80; rounded to nearest integers; standard errors omitted).

Inter-racial variation is typically as high as 0.125 or even 0.25 (between Pacific Islanders and Africans). In the latter case, intra-racial kinship is the equivalent of parental kinship. Higher variation across greater geographical distances means that populations organized competitively over those distances have higher within-population kinship. At the same time, aggregate kinship will increase due to the larger size of the polity. In other words, other factors being equal, group solidarity becomes more adaptive as the scale of political organization grows. In Table 2 I estimate the aggregate kinship in child-equivalents for different types of populations. The values differ for each continent, but the FST values adopted are realistic.

Child equivalents
N Inter-pop. FST Extended family kinship Non-family group members
Band 50 0.0005 5
Dialect group 500 0.005 5 10
Large tribe 5000 0.01 5 200
Modern nation 10 mill. 0.015 5 600,000
Racially different nations 10 mill. 0.125 5 5 mill.

Table 2.  Distribution of aggregate kinship in different sized autochthonous populations based on genetic distance to neighbouring populations of the same kind.

 

Table 2 indicates that beyond the band, ethnic solidarity could have been adaptive, assuming that competition existed between the larger social units, that free riders were controlled and that collective goods existed in which to invest.

From the emergence of tribes in the Neolithic, social organization spanning many miles would have created scope for collective goods that benefited many hundred or thousands of individuals. The positive relationship between geographic and genetic distance would have created an adaptive opportunity for aggressively expansive group strategies, perhaps in the autocatalytic process postulated by E. O. Wilson:

“A band might then dispose of a neighboring band, appropriate its territory, and increase its own genetic representation in the metapopulation, retaining the tribal memory of this successful episode, repeating it, increasing the geographical range of its occurrence, and quickly spreading its influence still further in the metapopulation. Such primitive cultural capacity would be permitted by the possession of certain genes” (E. O. Wilson 1975, p. 573).

Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1982) makes essentially the same point, by emphasizing group cohesion and territorial displacement. Likewise Hamilton combined the factors of aggressive territorial expansion.

“[P]rimate examples suggest the prototype war party as an all-male group, brothers and kin, practised as a team in successful hunting and at last redirecting its skill towards usurping the females or territory of another group. Out of such cells can be built the somewhat less stable organism of the postneolithic army. . . . If the male war party has been adaptive for as long as is surmised here, it is hardly surprising that a similar grouping often reappears spontaneously even in circumstances where its present adaptive value is low or negative, as in modern teenage gangs.” (Hamilton 1975, p. 148)

The key elements in the strategy would have been capturing territory and replacing the conquered population in whole or part. Ethnic nepotism in the form of advancing such a strategy or defending against it would have yielded fitness payoffs much larger, though less regularly, than familial nepotism.

The Hamilton-Harpending algorithm offers an analytical tool for estimating whether a population was (or is) a fit object for altruism, and thus whether that altruism was (or is) sustainable across evolutionary time.

Combining inclusive fitness theory with gene assay data has implications for the debate regarding group selection of altruism directed towards ethnies. Research attention long focused on the possibilities of group selection of altruism should be widened to look for the preconditions for extended kin selection: ethnic kinship; control of free riders; and the availability of collective goods facilitating ethnic continuity.

References

 Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (1992). Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethology and Sociobiology, 13: 171-195.

Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., Menozzi, P. and Piazza, A. (1994).  The history and geography of human genes. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.

Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. (1982). Warfare, man’s indoctrinability and group selection. Ethology (Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie), 60: 177-98.

Goetze, D. (1998). Evolution, mobility, and ethnic group formation. Politics and the Life Sciences, 17(1): 59-71.

Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetic evolution of social behavior, parts 1 and 2. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7: 1-51.

Hamilton, W. D. (1975). Innate social aptitudes of man: An approach from evolutionary genetics. In Biosocial anthropology, (ed. R. Fox), pp. 133-55. Malaby Press, London.

Harpending, H. (1979). The population genetics of interactions. American Naturalist, 113: 622-30.

Salter, F. K. (2002). Estimating ethnic genetic interests: Is it adaptive to resist replacement migration? Population and Environment, 24(2): 111-40.

Wilson, E. O. (1975).  Sociobiology: The new synthesis. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

Distinct ethnic phenomena – the Boyd circle

Moya, C. and R. Boyd (2015). “Different selection pressures give rise to distinct ethnic phenomena: A functionalist framework with illustrations from the Peruvian Altiplano.” Human Nature 26: 1-27.

Moya and Boyd advance the interesting idea that ethnic behaviour is not a unitary adaptation but consists of several distinct adaptations. Those are: stereotyping, essentialism 1 (belief in the biological transmission of characteristics and stability of identity), essentialism 2 (mutual exclusivity of group identity), intentional ethnic markers, intragroup assortment, and intergroup competition and hostility. By interviewing people from different communities in the Peruvian Altiplano, Moya and Boyd find evidence that these types of ethnic behaviour are not closely correlated. For example, stereotyping by language is weak but stronger by economic function. Even different types of essentialism, the idea that group characteristics are innate, do not covary. Language categories are not considered mutually exclusive but religions generally are.

This is an important addition to ethnicity research, though it raises questions.

The title promised insights into the different selection pressures that shaped how humans think about descent groups (ethnicity is at core a population believed to descend from common ancestors). But it seems that by “selection pressure” Moya and Boyd do not mean biological but cultural selection, because they make scant reference to biological evolution. This will be disappointing to readers who do not accept Boyd and Richerson’s theory of cultural group selection, the idea that cultural innovations can select for genes. They are less happy with the much older Darwinian idea that differences in genes can select for different cultures. That would be an example of essentialism, and like all the other ethnic categories discussed by Boyd and associates, it seems they are all disreputable hangovers from a less enlightened time.

So uncomfortable is the Boyd circle with genetic evolution that the one genetics study cited by Moya and Boyd is from 1997, before the Human Genome Diversity Project database got underway, and before findings based on it began to appear, such as the acceleration of human evolution over the last 10,000 years. Moya and Boyd are careful to distinguish communities from kin groups, as if robust ethnic kinship had not been hypothesised as a basis for intra-group altruism as long ago as 1971 by William Hamilton and confirmed by Henry Harpending in 1979 and again in 2002.[i] The thrust of their work is contained in a book title, by Richerson and Boyd, Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution (2005). A title that would have more accurately described their agenda is: Not By Genes At All. Like Moya and Boyd, they tend to ignore genetically-loaded ethnic markers, especially race, which they label essentialism. Physiognomy, hair form, colour, and personality differences are overlooked .Their citation lists exclude research on gene-based identity, such as by the late J. Philippe Rushton, who pioneered the application of life history theory to ethnicity, and Kevin MacDonald, who applied implicit processing theory to that subject.[ii] Tatu Vanhanen’s ground-breaking cross-cultural comparison of conflict and ethnic heterogeneity do not figure. Even sociobiological studies that link genetic diversity negatively to social cohesion are bypassed.[iii] But they do cite scholars such as Kurzban, Tooby and Cosmides who deny that ethnic kinship is significant.[iv]

Another disappointment with the paper is its apparent American ethnocentrism. The citations largely ignore European researchers who have made large contributions to ethnic studies. The Boyd circle regularly ignores such pioneers of evolutionary approaches as Irenaeus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Pierre van den Berghe, Tatu Vanhanen, and even the evolutionary psychology of  Ernst Fehr and colleagues in Switzerland. The latter’s groundbreaking work on parochial altruism and morality is surely relevant to the cultural as well as genetic ethnic markers.[v]

The Boyd school produces intricate work that has advanced interesting and useful ideas. However, it is constrained by ideology and parochialism, as well as minority ethnocentrism, which appears to play a gate-keeping role in choice of topics, concepts and even literature review.

ENDNOTES

[i] Hamilton, W. D. (1971). Selection of selfish and altruistic behavior in some extreme models. Man and beast: Comparative social behavior. J. F. Eisenberg and W. S. Dillon. Washington, D.C., Smithsonian Institute Press: 59-91, Appendix B.

Harpending, H. (1979). “The population genetics of interactions.” American Naturalist 113: 622—630.

Harpending, H. (2002). “Kinship and population subdivision.” Population and Environment 24(2): 141-147.

[ii] Salter, F. K. and H. Harpending (2013). “J. P. Rushton’s theory of ethnic nepotism.” Personality and Individual Differences http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191886912005569, Vol. 55: 256-260.

MacDonald, K. B. (2008). “Effortful control, explicit processing and the regulation of human evolved predispositions.” Psychological Review 115(4): 1012-1031.

And see MacDonald’s multi-dimensional theory of ethnicity: MacDonald, K. B. (2001). “An integrative evolutionary perspective on ethnicity.” Politics and the Life Sciences 20(1): 67-79.

[iii] E.g. Vanhanen, T. (2012). Ethnic conflicts: Their biological roots in ethnic nepotism. London, Ulster Institute for Social Research.

Salter, F. K. (2002). “Estimating ethnic genetic interests: Is it adaptive to resist replacement migration?” Population and Environment 24(2): 111-140.

[iv] Kurzban, R., J. Tooby and L. Cosmides (2001). “Can race be erased? Coalitional computation and social categorization.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 98: 15387-15392.

[v] Bernhard, H., U. Fischbacher and E. Fehr (2006). “Parochial altruism in humans.” Nature 442: 912-915.

 

Genetic similarity of friends

New research finds that friends share about 1% of their genes, equivalent to the kinship between fourth cousins.[1]  The research has been widely reported, though its full significance for social dynamics has been missed by journalists.[2]  The lead author of the research paper, Nicholas Christakis of Yale University, stated: “One per cent may not sound much to the lay person but to geneticists it is a significant number. . . . Choosing friends wisely improves your chances of survival.”

If 1% is significant, the 6% genetic kinship that is typical among members of the same ethnic group is large.  That is the figure estimated by geneticist Henry Harpending in a recent paper,[3] discussed in a previous post. The researchers must know about ethnic kinship because they controlled for it in their study.  They did so by limiting the study to friends formed within the same ethnic group.  Only by doing so could they have detected the relatively slight similarity between friends, which otherwise would have been swamped by the much greater ethnic differences.

Christakis and Fowler conclude that the phenotypical similarity of friends, on which assortment is based, reflects genetic similarity.

The result is that friends form an intermediate pool of kinship concentration lying between the ethny and the clan. Within the clan the nuclear family is the most intense concentration of kinship , while geographical races and humanity as a whole are the least concentrated. In descending order of concentration, kinship runs thus: Nuclear family, extended family (clan), friends, ethny, race, humanity. The sizes of each of these run in the opposite direction. However, the aggregate kinship within each pool does not correspond in any simple way with concentration. For example, according to Christakis and Fowler’s new data, someone with five close friends has a store of only 5% of his or her genes in them,[4] while just one child carries 25% of a parent’s genome.[5] Also, an ethnic group can hold millions of copies of a member’s genome, though it is more difficult to invest in this large aggregate kinship.[6]

Sharing genes with friends must have paid off in greater fitness in the evolutionary past, the authors argue.  By the same reasoning helping fellow ethnics can also advance fitness in multi-ethnic societies.

These new data add to the growing evidence of the important of genetic kinship as a factor in social ties beyond the family, consistent with sociobiological theory.  The fact that people show persistent assortment along the lines of genetic similarity despite fulsome praise of diversity in schools and the media should strike a cautionary note.  The finding is consistent with evidence that diversity undermines social cohesion and increases conflict.[7]

A disappointing feature of the study is its failure to mention what was, to my knowledge, the first finding of genetic similarity among friends.  That was conducted by the late J. Philippe Rushton, the Canadian evolutionary psychologist and published in a paper titled “Genetic Similarity in Male Friends” in 1989.[8]  Rushton replicated this finding using different methods in 2005.[9]  These groundbreaking studies deserve to be acknowledged.

Frank Salter

 

ENDNOTES

[1] Christakis, N. A. and J. H. Fowler (2014). “Friendship and natural selection.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences file:///C:/Users/Frank/Documents/DataFilesHOME/2014conferences+papersHOME/Consultancy2014/HumanNatureNews140330/Posts-drafts1403/PNAS-2014-Christakis-1400825111.pdf.

[2] Hannah Devlin (2014). “Our friends are closer to us than we think”, The Australian, 16 July, p. 9. Reprinted from The Times of London. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/our-friends-are-closer-to-us-than-we-think/story-fnb64oi6-1226990253506.

[3] Salter, F. K. and H. Harpending (2013). “J. P. Rushton’s theory of ethnic nepotism.” Personality and Individual Differences http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191886912005569 55: 256-260.

[4] 5 x 1%

[5] Both measures being made against the baseline of the parent’s ethnic population. For technical reasons parental kinship is 25%, half of the more intuitive measure of relatedness.

[6] Salter, F. K. (2007/2003). On genetic interests. Family, ethnicity, and humanity in an age of mass migration. New York, Transaction.

[7] Vanhanen, T. (2012). Ethnic conflicts: Their biological roots in ethnic nepotism. London, Ulster Institute for Social Research.

[8] Rushton, J. P. (1989). “Genetic similarity in male friends.” Ethology and Sociobiology 10: 361-73.

[9] Rushton, J. P. (2005). “Mate choice and friendship in twins: Evidence for genetic similarity.” Psychological Science 16(7): 555-59.

 

Strong Ethnic Kinship Confirmed

A recent analysis by American geneticist Henry Harpending has confirmed his earlier finding that the genetic similarity of members of ethnic groups is typically that of first cousins.[1] (Genetic similarity is known as “kinship” in genetics.)

The finding has profound implications for understanding ethnic and racial solidarity and conflict. These implications will be discussed in future posts in HNN. The present report summarises the findings and the methods used to derive them.

The first estimation based on Harpending’s genetic model was made in 2002 using old genetic assay data provided by Cavalli-Sforza and colleagues, in their landmark book The History and Geography of Human Genes, published in 1994.[2]

The new estimation is based on a much larger database recently collected by the Human Genome Project. The new data are also much more accurate. Cavalli-Sforza’s gene tests looked at fewer than 100 sites in the genome. With improvements in technology, the new methods look at up to a million sites spread throughout the genome.

The figures show ethnic kinship in a mixed population of French and Japanese. A fellow ethnic has a kinship of around 0.06, which is just below that of first cousins within an ethnic group (0.065). Kinship with members of the other ethnic group is negative, also at 0.06. 

This makes an ethnic group a very large genetic kin group, but only when it interacts with other ethnic groups. Ethnic kinship is zero within homogeneous societies.

In an ethnically mixed society of French and Japanese, an ethnic group numbering one million carries 120,000 copies of each member’s genome. By comparison, a family of three children carries 1.5 copies of each parent’s genome.[3] If children represent parents’ “reproductive interests” or “genetic interests”, ethnic groups represent a much greater interest for their members. Genetically speaking, our ethnic families are 5 or 6 orders of magnitude larger than our nuclear families.

The emotions that so often mark ethnic affairs begin to make sense, even though they evolved in small scale societies with smaller genetic aggregates. Genetic survival is at stake in the welfare of our ethnic groups as it is in the welfare of our children.

This might seem simple, as if ethnic identity can be reduced to counting genes. That is not how the human mind works, a distinction that I will discuss in future posts. Suffice it that descent is what defines and motivates kinship systems. Members of an ethnic group believe that they share common ancestors, as well as sharing culture. This perceived kinship, expressed in folkloric metaphors such as “shared blood”, explains why ethnic motivation can be so strong. Knowledge of genetics might in principle substitute for folklore but has not been necessary for thousands of years. By and large, beliefs about ancestry are accurate, so that folkloric beliefs about ethnicity generally correspond to genetic identity. This contradicts the sociological theory that ethnicity and race are socially constructed with no role for biology.

A fuller explanation of the original findings and their social and political implications can be found in my book On Genetic Interests.[4] I shall discuss ethnic kinship again in Human Nature News.

Frank Salter, 31st March 2014


Endnotes

[1] Salter, F. K. and H. Harpending (2012). “J. P. Rushton’s theory of ethnic nepotism.” Personality and Individual Differences http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191886912005569.

Harpending, H. (2002). “Kinship and population subdivision.” Population and Environment 24(2): 141-147.

[2] Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., P. Menozzi and A. Piazza (1994). The history and geography of human genes. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

Salter, F. K. (2002). “Estimating ethnic genetic interests: Is it adaptive to resist replacement migration?” Population and Environment 24(2): 111-140.

[3] In an outbred population.

[4] Salter, F. K. (2007/2003). On genetic interests. Family, ethnicity, and humanity in an age of mass migration. New York, Transaction.